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SYMPOSIUM 
THE CHANGING FACE OF CORPORATE 
COMPLIANCE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Editors’ Forward 
We are pleased to present this Symposium on the revolution in 
corporate compliance and its evolution in the financial services industry. 
This is the annual symposium hosted by the Fordham Journal of 
Corporate & Financial Law on significant topics in the realm of 
business law. 
The format of the symposium is as follows. It begins with an 
introduction by Professor Sean Griffith, followed by edited transcripts of 
the two panel discussions and the keynote address. 
The first panel is “Revolution: Challenging Corporate Norms?” and 
addresses the question of whether the revolution in corporate 
compliance challenges the established norms of corporate law and 
corporate governance. The panel focuses on the trends in corporate 
compliance, the effects of compliance across multiple industries, and the 
different perspectives regarding compliance education and 
professionalization. The second panel is “Evolution: Impacting 
Financial Services” and analyzes how the compliance function has 
evolved within the financial services industry. The panel focuses on the 
current role of compliance and its impact on financial institutions. 
We are grateful to our sponsor for the Symposium: The Corporate 
Law Center. 
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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
SEAN GRIFFITH: My name is Sean Griffith. I am the T.J. 
Maloney Chair and Professor of Law. I direct the Corporate Law Center 
and I am the faculty adviser for the compliance programs at Fordham 
University School of Law. It falls to me to welcome you to this 
interesting symposium on the changing face of compliance and 
corporate governance organized by the Fordham Journal of Corporate 
& Financial Law and also by the Corporate Law Center. We are 
especially proud of our Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, which is 
the number one cited student periodical on banking and financial 
regulation, and we are very grateful for the help of the Journal in 
organizing this event. 
Fordham Law School, I am proud to say, is a leader in the area of 
corporate compliance. The Law School offers a number of courses in the 
area of compliance and two degree programs in corporate compliance. 
In addition to offering a number of compliance programs for our JDs, 
the Law School launched the first LLM in corporate compliance in the 
United States just this past fall. Fordham Law School is also attempting 
to put together a degree program for non-lawyers, a Masters in Science 
of the Law, in the area of corporate compliance. 
This is an exciting area for us. Fordham Law School is a true 
believer in the importance of the compliance field. The School is just so 
pleased today to have so many real leaders in the business area, chief 
compliance officers from major financial institutions, and real thought 
leaders in this area in our panels. We are going to have two panels today 
followed by keynote remarks. Panel I will be academic in focus. It 
features three academic commentators in the area of compliance. Panel 
II will be more practitioner-focused with a greater real world 
orientation. It will be moderated by Gerald Manwah, a managing 
director in financial crime at Barclays and one of the directors of our 
compliance programs at Fordham. At the end of the morning, we will 
have keynote remarks by Tom Baxter, who is general counsel and 
executive vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. I 
want to thank you all for being here and I want to turn the festivities 
over to my colleague, Steve Thel. 
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STEVEN THEL: Hi, I am Steve Thel. I teach here at the Law 
School and I want to welcome you too. As Sean said, Panel I, entitled 
“Revolution: Challenging Corporate Norms?,” is a group of academics 
and the first speaker is Sean. After that, Geoff Miller from New York 
University School of Law and Miriam Baer from Brooklyn Law School 
will speak. Then we will have time for questions. With that, let us start 
out with Sean. 
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PANEL I: REVOLUTION: CHALLENGING CORPORATE NORMS? 
SEAN GRIFFITH: I have fifteen minutes to present a paper that I 
have been working on for some time about the relationship between 
corporate governance and compliance as a legal academic in the area of 
corporate law. I have long focused on corporate governance, and the 
question I sought to answer is, what is the relationship between 
corporate law and corporate governance? The paper is partially 
motivated by a quotation that appeared in the New York Times about 
two years ago. The quotation is from somebody who is close to a 
banking board of a big financial institution. He joked, “the only thing 
bank directors have more of these days is meetings.”1 
Regulators have all but stripped the board of the main powers that 
they had before the crisis. If the board has been stripped of its main 
governance powers, who is governing? I think a lot of who is doing 
governance in major financial institutions and other types of 
corporations is the compliance function. 
What I would like to talk about and hopefully persuade you of 
today are the following four points with some sub-points. The first one 
is that compliance is important, and I probably do not have to spend a 
lot of time with folks in this room emphasizing that compliance is 
important. We are here because we know that compliance is important. 
However, I do want to try to persuade you that compliance is 
governance and that it is a big deal because it will create implications 
for how we think about governance, implications for how we think 
about corporate law theory, and implications for how we should think 
about doing compliance. Then at the end, there will be a little policy 
suggestion. What I really want to focus on is a theoretical problem. 
Point two covers the definitions of compliance and governance. 
What is compliance and what is governance? We can take a definition of 
compliance from Geoff’s book where he says that compliance is “the 
processes by which an organization seeks to ensure that employees and 
other constituents conform to applicable norms—which can include 
either the requirements of laws or regulations or the internal rules of the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Susanne Craig, At Banks, Board Pay Soars amid Cutbacks, NY TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Mar. 31, 2013, 9:57 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/31/pay-
for-boards-at-banks-soars-amid-cutbacks/?_r=1 [http://perma.cc/RVA6-NM84]. 
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organization.”2 What is compliance? Compliance is the means by which 
firms adapt their behavior or the behavior of actors within the firm to a 
relevant universe of norms. That relevant universe of norms is important 
because it can include not only the legal strictures that the firm operates 
within but also things like reputation, internal ethics, policies, goals, and 
aspirational norms. 
As an operational matter, what is compliance? It is a department, 
right? Something new about compliance is that there is a whole 
department headed by an officer or the chief compliance officer with a 
staff. In many organizations, the chief compliance officer is the co-equal 
of the chief legal officer and that is a big deal, right? This new 
department exists within the organization. You might say, “Well, so 
what? There is also an IT department in organizations and nobody talks 
about information technology and governance.” But compliance is 
different from information technology for two reasons. One is that 
compliance does core governance functions. What is governance? Geoff 
also defines it in his book. Governance involves the structure of control 
within an organization and it is defined by reference to the process of 
decision-making which has the ultimate control of the firm.3 
Now, when we talk about governance in corporate law, we 
normally talk about two different ways of thinking. One is what happens 
inside the firm, also known as intrafirm governance. If you are a 
Delaware corporate law junkie, this is the stuff of the duty of care. 
Intrafirm governance involves the question of how to engage in 
monitoring and overseeing the internal affairs of the business. Then 
there is another aspect of corporate governance which involves 
ownership-type decisions such as takeovers and proxy fights. Intra-firm 
and corporate governance are essentially identical. Monitoring and 
overseeing the internal affairs of the organization is what compliance 
does, and that is a core corporate governance function and that is a big 
deal. Compliance is different from information technology in the sense 
that it has a core governance component. It is also different from 
                                                                                                                 
 2. GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND 
COMPLIANCE 3 (2014). 
 3. Id. at 2. 
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information technology in the sense of who the author of that 
department is. I will come back to that in a second. 
This furthers the point that compliance is really governance. This is 
an organizational chart of the compliance function for the Wal-Mart 
Corporation. 4  Wal-Mart is a retailer and not in a heavily regulated 
industry like financial services or pharmaceuticals. Wal-Mart got in 
trouble for bribery and completely revamped its compliance function. 
What does this show you? It shows you that there are all these different 
compliance officers with all these different responsibilities in all these 
different regions around the world. Then there is this part, which is the 
part that I like best. When Wal-Mart revised its compliance function, it 
nested within compliance fourteen areas: anti-corruption, anti-money 
laundering, anti-trust, consumer protection, environment, food safety, 
health and safety, health and wellness, labor and employment, licenses 
and permits, privacy, product safety, responsible sourcing, and trade.5 
All of these functions come within the Wal-Mart compliance 
department. These are general internal control functions; the general 
processes which involve how Wal-Mart conducts its business on a day-
to-day basis. That is part of what compliance can be and has become for 
many organizations. Compliance exerts a broad governance function. 
That is this point. 
A second part of what is interesting about compliance is where 
compliance comes from. Here is a model of the firm. We normally think 
of corporations as boxes. Sitting on top of that corporation is a board of 
directors. Inside the box, there are the executive functions of the firm—
the chief officer positions. Normally, when corporate law academics like 
me talk about the ways in which we influence the governance of firms, 
we talk about influencing the board of directors. For example, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires that the audit committee members 
of the board be wholly independent.6 That is a governance change in that 
it is a change directed at the board of directors’ level. What is different 
about compliance is that the governance changes are aimed at the 
executive level. The changes are aimed at the functional level of the 
                                                                                                                 
 4. WAL-MART, WALMART’S GLOBAL COMPLIANCE PROGRAM REPORT ON FISCAL 
YEAR 2014, at 3 illus. Global Compliance Organizational Structure (2014). 
 5. Id. at 4 illus. 14 Global Compliance Subject Matter Areas. 
 6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775-
77 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2012)). 
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firm where the business actually operates. For example, after a money 
laundering failure, a financial institution must hire hundreds or 
thousands of employees to engage in the monitoring and surveillance of 
transactions. That is a governance change, but it is also a change within 
the organization. That is to say, within the structures of how the firm 
actually conducts its business, as opposed to just oversight structures on 
the top. 
What else is different? Those changes come from the federal 
government. They come from incentives under the sentencing 
guidelines, where you do not get as much of a sanction if you have an 
effective compliance department. They come from incentives under the 
charging function of prosecutors and they also come under prosecutorial 
agreements. What does that mean? Well, there is a big implication here 
too. Here is a model of corporate governance. The shareholders are on 
the bottom and the evil managers are on the top. Normally, when we 
talk about how corporate governance is made, we talk about a process of 
negotiation between the shareholders and the managers, but that is not 
what we are talking about here. We are talking about compliance 
because compliance is really a function of government intervention, 
often by a prosecutor. Compliance is not made by agreement between 
prosecutors and shareholders because these people never meet and they 
never agree. Compliance is made in an agreement between prosecutors 
and managers. The agency cost issue is all over the place. Where 
corporate law academics normally consider agency cost problems as 
between managers and shareholders, here, we have agency cost 
problems where the shareholders are not even involved. There is no vote 
to approve compliance changes that the government prosecutor brings 
into the firm. 
This makes me think about a variety of the Coase Theorem. There 
is a famous line from Ronald Coase’s article, The Nature of the Firm.7 
In The Nature of the Firm, Coase writes, “If a workman moves from 
department Y to department X, he does not go because of a change in 
relative prices, but because he is ordered to do so.”8 When I think about 
                                                                                                                 
 7. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
 8. Id. at 387. 
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compliance, I think we have to revise that view of why people move 
around in the firm, and here is how I would revise it. If a workman 
moves into the compliance department, he does not go there because of 
a change in prices, but because the government has ordered the company 
to hire him. What does that mean? It means that the government is 
making corporate governance. It is an executive level function. What 
should we think about that? Well, what do we think about government 
lawmaking in general? 
Here we can juxtapose the interest of the United States with the 
interest of Delaware, which is a traditional corporate governance 
regulator. One thing that academics have pointed out about Delaware is 
that there are only about two constituencies at play in the making of 
corporate governance under Delaware law: shareholders and managers. 
Those are the only two parties that make the choice about where the 
firm incorporates. As a result, shareholders and managers are the only 
two parties that Delaware law seeks to appease. That is not the same in 
the federal government. The United States Government, through the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and other types of regulatory 
organizations, does worry about shareholders and managers, but the 
federal government has many other constituencies that it protects such 
as laborers, creditors, consumers, and social responsibility-type 
interests. 
What is interesting about the federal government is that there is a 
disincentive for the federal government to be overly active in corporate 
governance. The disincentive arises because legislators get worked up 
after scandals when they feel like there is a broad consensus for reform. 
But those are legislators. If corporate governance via compliance is 
made not primarily by legislators, but by individual prosecutors, there is 
a question about when prosecutors get motivated. What motivates a 
prosecutor to act? Does that mean that a government prosecutor is more 
likely to enforce the other constituencies that the federal government is 
responsible to more aggressively than a legislator? 
All right, I am just waving at these issues. I am obviously not 
closing them for right now. My third big implication is for compliance 
itself. What does it mean that we have compliance coming into 
organizations as a result of prosecutorial interests following periods of 
corporate scandal or corporate failures? What are the implications 
specifically for compliance? One implication is that we do not really 
know for sure whether the compliance functions that these outside 
influencers are bringing in are cost effective from the organizational 
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point of view. Is the growth of compliance costs justified by the value 
that they produce to an organization? There are a couple of different 
ways that you can break that question down. One is whether the 
infrastructure that we build around compliance creates value that we can 
show regulators to cause them to forbear in the event that they become 
interested in our organization versus whether that infrastructure really 
produces benefits net of costs. How do we demonstrate the effectiveness 
of that infrastructure? 
Again, there are two ways of thinking about this. How do we 
demonstrate effectiveness to a regulator? One answer might be to show 
them how busy we are in our compliance department, how many 
training hours our employees have been through, what percentage of 
completion our employees have finished compliance modules, and so 
on. How would we demonstrate the effectiveness of compliance, not 
necessarily to a regulator, but to a CEO or an investor? 
The other question might be, is compliance really the highest and 
best use of our time and resources? To put it in a less provocative way, 
is there an additional marginal investment in compliance? Let us say 
that we are going to have some compliance. How do we know that this 
additional investment is really the highest and best use of our resources? 
What is the right level? For example, let us say that a bank gets in 
trouble for an anti-money laundering violation and is ordered by the 
federal government to increase staff compliance from 80 to 1000. Eighty 
might not be enough, but what is the theoretical support for 1000 being 
the right number and what level of support is there for any of these 
things being at the right level? How do companies pick? How should 
they comply? 
One answer might be that there is compliance creep going on here. 
What is compliance creep? Compliance creep occurs when different 
organizations look at other peer organizations and the infrastructures 
that they have built around compliance. Whether they want to or not, 
they have to build similar infrastructures. Why? Because if you are bank 
X and you get in trouble, the enforcer is going to say to you, “Well, look 
at bank Y and Z. Look at their compliance infrastructure. Yours is forty 
percent less and now you are in trouble.” Post hoc ergo propter hoc. 
“You are in trouble because you are forty percent leaner in compliance 
than they are.” How can you do that? The answer is thinking about that 
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ex-ante. That bank knows that that is a possible argument it is going to 
face and therefore has an incentive to up staff even if it is not worth it. 
What should we do about this? This is an assumption, by the way, 
that there is anything to be done or that we should do anything. One 
possibility is that we should just accept that this is how governance 
works now. Delaware corporate law has abandoned intrafirm corporate 
governance because of the business judgment rule. Thus, Delaware is 
out of it. The regulatory state enforced a vacuum. The feds are in it and 
it is just the way it is going to be, and we have to learn to live with that. 
If we wanted to put the genie back in the bottle, how could we do it? It 
is not that complicated. One way is to take away the incentive structure 
for government-sponsored corporate therapeutics so that there are no 
more incentives for effective compliance. Organizations would no 
longer get a sentencing act reduction and no longer get a charging 
reduction for having an effective compliance function. Just take it off 
the table. “We cannot give you a reduction for that. We are not even 
going to look at it. We are not even going to ask and we are not going to 
ask in our DPAs [deferred prosecution agreements] and NPAs [non-
prosecution agreements]. We are not going to ask you to implement 
compliance reforms because we, the federal government, do not know 
what good compliance reforms are and we think you might not know 
either. Thus, we certainly cannot foist them upon you.” 
What is the result of that? What if we did that? Would companies 
stop complying with the law? The answer is no because we are not 
asking the federal government to just stop bringing enforcement actions. 
The government should bring enforcement actions to the full extent of 
the law and extract sanctions as much as it possibly can. If companies no 
longer had the federal incentive of building effective compliance 
programs, companies would build compliance programs that are cost 
effective and that make sense from the organizations’ perspective. 
Another thing we could do is get judges more involved in the 
termination of investigations. A lot of these DPAs and NPAs happen 
without significant, or any, judicial supervision. Judges should be 
involved. In other words, there is not an adverse party here. Judges 
should become that adverse party. Maybe judges should permit 
shareholder objections to DPAs and NPAs. 
Finally, I would say that we should have public disclosure of the 
details of company compliance programs. One of the reasons that we do 
not know whether compliance works or know what works in compliance 
is that companies do not report what they do in compliance. It is not 
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possible to run studies about the effectiveness of anti-money laundering 
structure X versus anti-money laundering structure Y. We cannot run 
those studies because we do not have that data because companies do 
not report. Why do we not take the compliance incentive out and make 
companies report what they do in compliance so that the capital markets 
can create a compliance incentive in place of more direct federal 
intervention? Those are my provocative remarks. 
STEVE THEL: Thank you, Sean. Once again, Sean speaks for 
himself, not for Fordham Law School. Our next presenter is Geoff 
Miller who is the Stuyvesant Comfort Professor of Law at NYU and 
director of their program on corporate compliance enforcement, and also 
the author of the first casebook on compliance. Geoff? 
GEOFFREY MILLER: First of all, thank you for the invite, Sean, 
and also to the student editors. I think it is a testament to the importance 
of this topic that on a snowy day in New York, so many people have 
come to this event. The event itself bespeaks the importance of the topic. 
Congratulations to the organizers. As Steve mentioned, I am interested 
in compliance in part because NYU has a program. It is not quite the 
same as Fordham’s program. It is not a degree-offering program, but it 
is an academic program on corporate compliance and enforcement that I 
run with Jennifer Arlen, another professor at NYU. 
Also, we have recently had the good fortune of the American Law 
Institute [ALI] initiating a project on principles of governance, risk 
management, and compliance, of which I am the chief reporter, so that, 
hopefully, will develop some principles that might be useful in assessing 
compliance. Also, we hope it will respond to the concerns that Sean 
mentioned, namely that compliance today is often developed from a sort 
of ad hoc, back-of-the-envelope way through enforcement proceedings. 
We are hoping to have a somewhat more systematic analysis in the ALI 
project. 
I would also like to second Sean’s remarks about the importance 
and novelty of this topic. Compliance really is something new in 
governance, and it is not only something new in governance but it is also 
emblematic of broader changes in the governance of complex 
organizations that are really significant, and that we in academics have 
only begun to get our hands around. This is something that people who 
are in organizations know about, but believe me, most of us in 
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academics have not known about it. It is something new for us, and we 
are only beginning to grasp the significance of the changes that have 
occurred. It is also something new in academics. There were no courses 
in compliance, no book on compliance. Over the past year, this is 
changing very rapidly. I published a book, as Steve mentioned, that can 
be used as teaching materials, and compliance courses are developing all 
over the country. Also, there is scholarship in compliance, as Sean’s 
paper illustrates. Miriam has also done excellent scholarship in this area 
as well as others. 
Compliance is theoretically and practically interesting and 
beginning to become a real academic field with real substance and real 
literature. Compliance is important because it has practical 
consequences, among other things. There are many jobs in compliance, 
but compliance is also very important to the welfare of highly regulated 
institutions such as banks and other firms. There is also an important 
theoretical aspect. If you think about it, what is law but the effect that 
rules have on people’s behavior? Until recently, the compliance function 
has been a black box. We have not seen into it, but we have observed 
the output, which is people behaving in certain ways. You might have 
rules on insider trading, but those rules get filtered through compliance 
departments into concrete rules for action that may only have a 
tangential relationship to the rules themselves. The compliance 
department has to deal with traders who are not sophisticated in law and 
need to have workable standards for conduct that can be administered 
and enforced. This is something we have known nothing about, but it is 
really a very important part of American law and we are only beginning 
to study that. 
Also, I believe this is a new field that goes beyond law because, as 
many of you know, compliance departments have lawyers, but they also 
have non-lawyers. The compliance function is partly a legal function, 
partly a management function, and partly involves other important 
topics such as sociology, psychology, and other fields. This is a 
multidisciplinary area of study that is not limited to law. We are into 
something that is interesting and changing rapidly. Now, my paper is 
quite academic, but it is motivated by practical concerns. I would like to 
say that part of the academic interest in this topic is that we academics 
need to learn from you—at least those of you who are here in the 
audience who work in compliance. It is not that you need to learn from 
us, even though we are teachers. We need to learn from you because you 
have the information that we lack, and we are late in catching up to the 
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importance of this topic. A lot of what we are hoping to do is learn from 
people who are in the area about how it actually works. 
Now, the paper I am going to present has to do with the concern 
that Sean mentioned, which is the concern for the efficiency 
implications of compliance. I am going to try to do this looking at the 
concept of an effective compliance program, but not considering this 
issue in the way it is ordinarily understood,. We will look at it through a 
little bit more of a fundamental lens. 
The standards for effective compliance programs take the form of 
lists. There are many of them out there. The Bank Secrecy Act has four 
elements: internal policies, compliance officer, training, and internal 
audit.9 The Volcker Rule has six requirements: written policies, internal 
controls, framework of accountability, independent audit, training, and 
maintaining records. 10  The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has ten 
requirements and some are the same, but other ones include third party 
due diligence, confidential reporting, pre-acquisition due diligence, and 
post-acquisition integration. 11  Leslie Caldwell of the Department of 
Justice recently gave a speech where she identified either nine or ten 
requirements of effective compliance programs, depending upon how 
you read the speech.12 
These are all quite interesting, but notice that they are lists. Lists 
have great value because we can look at the lists and see the things we 
need to do. Lists also have some shortcomings. The shortcoming is, in 
part, that we do not know what is truly important and what is less 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified as 
amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2012)), amended by USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. 
No. 107-56, § 352, 115 Stat. 272, 322 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5318). 
 10. 17 C.F.R. § 255.20 (2014). 
 11. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1); see also CRIMINAL DIV. OF THE U.S. DOJ & ENF’T 
DIV. OF THE U.S. SEC, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES 
ACT 57-62 (2012), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015 
/01/16/guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/2K98-BL5K]. 
 12. Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Div. of the U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the Compliance Week Conference (May 19, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-caldwell-delivers-
remarks-compliance-week-conference [http://perma.cc/FYH7-QS7W0]. 
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important. There is no weighing of the lists. Also because the lists vary, 
you get the idea that some things might be included in some lists that 
other lists left out. We do not know the comprehensiveness of the lists. 
Lists are valuable. They share common themes. They are concrete and 
can be implemented. They are adapted to specific issues. They probably 
reflect the agencies’ stake, but they do have these shortcomings: not 
systematic and not comprehensive. They do not provide guidance on 
how factors are weighed and they seem to reflect slightly different 
standings of the topic. That is where we are about. If you want to look at 
the standards for an effective compliance program, you look at these 
lists and try to derive information from them. 
These lists are not quite as chaotic as the ones referred to in 
Borges’ short story, Celestial Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge, 
which categorizes all the animals in the form of a list. The list includes 
animals belonging to the emperor, embalmed ones, those that are 
trained, suckling pigs, mermaids, fabulous ones, stray dogs, those 
included in this classification, those that tremble madly, innumerable 
ones, those drawn with a camelhair brush, those that broke the flower 
vase, and those that resemble flies from afar.13 The lists that have been 
developed to define effective compliance programs are not crazy and 
chaotic like this, but they have some resemblance in that they do not 
identify the central quality that makes a compliance program effective. 
As a useful supplement, not as a replacement by any means, and 
not even as something that can always be of practical use, but as an 
intellectual exercise, it is useful to try to get to the fundamental core of 
an effective compliance program with a simple economic analysis. Now, 
there are going to be some equations. We start with an assumption that 
employees of a profit-maximizing firm engage in random illegal 
conduct. The government imposes a fine for proven violations that is 
administrated with a defined probability z. The sanction that the firm 
experienced is the probability of sanction multiplied by the fine, which 
in this formula is called pf. We assume that the government sets the 
sanction for violations of social cost. Of course, the government does 
not do this, as Sean pointed out, but tries to do it to some extent. 
The social cost equals pf. If the government imposes the full social 
cost with violations on the firm, then the firm’s incentive is to do what is 
                                                                                                                 
 13. JORGE LUIS BORGES, The Analytical Language of John Wilkins, in OTHER 
INQUISITIONS: 1937-1952 at 101, 103 (Ruth L. C. Simms trans., 1964). 
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socially optimal because it has to bear the social cost of any violations 
that occur. We now have a firm that is profit maximizing, but also 
incentivized to engage in optimal action from a social point of view. 
What is the firm going to do? First, it is going to spend money on 
compliance, what I call C. 
How much is the firm going to spend? The first step is 
understanding that the more money the firm spends on compliance, the 
more violations the firm deters. But, this feature occurs at a decreasing 
rate. At the beginning, the firm achieves a lot through compliance 
expenditures, and then there is a decreasing deterrence of violations as 
the spend goes up. Eventually, the firm will achieve little or nothing for 
each additional compliance dollar spent. 
Now, if you have compliance, what is the firm’s cost of violations? 
It is simply the cost of the violations that remain with compliance: 
  
ሺ1 െ ݖሻሺ݌݂ሻ ൅ ܥ 
 
That is the firm’s cost of violations with the compliance program in 
effect. Now, when will the firm engage in compliance? It will do this if 
the cost of sanctions with compliance is less than or equal to the costs of 
sanctions without compliance. The cost of sanctions with compliance 
has to be less than or equal to pf. If you improve cost by having a 
compliance program, you are going to implement the program. This is 
mathematically equivalent to the proposition that the firm will spend on 
compliance if the cost of compliance is less than or equal to the cost of 
the sanctions you avoid. 
As long as the cost of your compliance program is less than the cost 
of the sanctions you avoid, you are going to spend on compliance. That 
makes sense because that is the profit-maximizing thing to do. How 
much will the firm spend on compliance? It wants to expend resources 
up to the point where the marginal cost of compliance equals the 
marginal cost of the sanctions avoided. That optimal point of 
compliance I call Ĉ. It generates a benefit to the firm as compared to the 
situation without compliance equal to z(pf) - Ĉ. That means that cost of 
sanctions avoided minus the cost of the compliance program is the 
benefit to the firm from an optimal compliance operation. 
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Ĉ is the optimal amount a firm will spend on compliance. At least 
there is a first approximation and it maximizes the social surplus. It is 
the efficient thing for the firm to do and it is what society wants the firm 
to do. Society does not want the firm to spend more than Ĉ because if 
the firm spends more than Ĉ, you get more cost of compliance than you 
get benefit in terms of violations avoided. 
That gives us some definition of an effective compliance program 
within this framework. An effective compliance program is the set of 
policies and procedures that a rational, profit maximizing firm would 
establish if it faced an expected sanction equal to the social cost of 
violations. That is what we like to look for. 
Now, that is the basic path of the paper. I do not have time to go 
into detail, but I will just spend the next three minutes describing this. 
The one very interesting implication of this has to do with Gary 
Becker’s theory of punishment. 14  Becker suggested that the optimal 
punishment is one where you have a low probability of detection and a 
high fine. You get the same degree of deterrence with the low 
probability of detection and a high fine as with a high probability of 
detection and a low fine. But you get this deterrent at a lower 
expenditure because the government needs fewer policemen on the beat 
if you have a low probability of detection. 
Becker’s theory is commonly interpreted to say that the optimal 
enforcement regime involves a low probability of detection and a high 
fine. What this interpretation misses is the fact that if there is a low 
probability of detection and high fine, the firm that is subject to the 
enforcement is going to adopt costly compliance programs. The Becker 
optimal enforcement model, suggesting a low probability of detection 
and high fine, needs to be qualified by the fact that we have to take into 
account the cost of compliance. 
Let me turn to the concern, voiced by Sean and others, about the 
government imposing too much compliance spend on companies. Why 
is the government likely to do this? Government officials do not spend 
that money, but experience a reputational cost if there is a violation. As 
a result, government officials want the firm to spend an inefficient 
amount on compliance in some cases. This theory would provide some 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in ESSAYS IN 
THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 1 (Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes 
eds., 1974). 
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support for the proposition that firms should spend less in compliance 
than what the government would prefer. Obviously, they should not 
adopt less than the socially optimal amount, but less than the 
government would prefer because the government would prefer firms to 
spend more in compliance than is socially optimal. 
This is not to say that we should not have compliance. It is 
important that we have compliance. But we do not have to have 
compliance to the point where society is worse off with the compliance 
program in place than it would be without the program in place. 
Thank you very much. 
STEVE THEL: Thank you Geoff. Our next speaker is Miriam Baer 
from Brooklyn Law School. She is also active as a corporate scholar and 
has a history as a prosecutor. Thus, she offers, perhaps, a perspective 
that the first two speakers felt was overheard, but I think she is going to 
have perspectives that you have not yet heard. 
MIRIAM BAER: Thank you so much. As Steve’s introduction 
indicated, I am a lawyer and I identify with lawyers. I highlight that 
because what I am going to say may sound somewhat crazy or anti-
lawyer. Although I was a prosecutor, I also worked for Verizon in 
compliance. So, I have some perspective from the compliance side, and 
I am sympathetic to the challenges that the corporate compliance officer 
typically faces on a daily basis. 
Sean and Geoff very nicely laid out for you the big issues for 
compliance at 30,000 feet. I am interested in a much narrower issue that 
is closer to the ground, which is the corporate investigation. When we 
talk about compliance, we mean many things. We mean education and 
training. We mean the inculcation of norms and the creation of policies. 
We also mean how well the corporation investigates itself, identifies 
wrongdoing, and reports that wrongdoing to authorities. I am 
particularly interested, not just in the corporate investigation, but in the 
corporate attorney-client privilege. I am going to talk a little bit about 
some recent cases that have arisen in the last year or so, and then 
consider the normative implications of the corporate attorney client 
privilege. Namely, if we step back and remove our cloaks as lawyers, do 
we really think the privilege is worth preserving, at least as it arises 
within the corporate investigation? That is my question for today. 
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Let us just start right now. There is a very big structural compliance 
debate out there that many of you are aware of. We all understand that 
there is a general counsel’s office. There is something out there that we 
think of as the corporate compliance office. There is a great debate 
whether the compliance function should be separate from the general 
counsel’s office and have a direct line to the corporation’s board of 
directors. Then we ask who should be conducting the corporation’s 
investigations? How do these two functions join together to conduct the 
corporation’s internal investigations? 
There are also smaller issues. When I say smaller, I do not mean 
smaller as in less important to the firm, but, certainly, narrower issues. 
Should we have in-house counsel playing a role in the investigation? 
Should we have outside counsel? Should we, in fact, have independent 
outside counsel, meaning we have a law firm that has never had any 
kind of relationship with the company before? Now, to some degree, the 
situation itself will dictate the outcome. If you wake up the next 
morning and the New York Times has some huge blockbuster piece 
detailing how your subsidiary in Mexico was paying lots and lots of 
bribes to government officials, you will probably ask someone other 
than in-house counsel to investigate that. 
Nevertheless, these are the types of debates that one frequently 
hears. Certainly among legal scholars, there have been a number of 
debates regarding the appropriate structure of corporate investigation. 
Underlying these debates is the assumption that legal counsel ought to 
direct the investigation in order to retain and protect the company’s 
attorney-client privilege. In this talk, I want to take the step back and 
ask, well, what about the attorney-client privilege? 
Let me start with just a little bit of background, which many of you 
here already know. If you were to climb into your DeLorean and go 
back in time, the big issue in the 1970s and 1980s before the Supreme 
Court decided Upjohn15 pertained to the identity of the privilege holder. 
Who represented the corporation? Who was it that could speak to the 
corporation’s attorney such that we would say this person’s 
communication was privileged? At the time, some courts had held that 
the employee had to be within some sort of control group of the 
corporation for his communication to be privileged. Upjohn upended 
these lower court decisions. In Upjohn, the Supreme Court confirmed 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
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that the corporation retains its own attorney-client privilege.16 The Court 
rejected the control group test as overly narrow and emphasized how 
important it is for the corporation’s lawyer to be able to consult with as 
many employees as possible so that the lawyer can obtain the factual 
information he needs to provide effective legal advice. A broader 
privilege, the Court advised, was necessary to encourage full and frank 
communication throughout the organization. 
Upjohn was a company that had received information that 
suggested wrongdoing and then used its own internal lawyers to 
investigate these allegations. The company’s attorneys distributed 
questionnaires to the company’s employees, who in turn, provided 
information about the alleged wrongdoing. The employees knew that 
there was an investigation and the company eventually disclosed the 
result of its investigation to the SEC and the IRS. The IRS did not quite 
trust Upjohn’s recitation of what had happened so it decided to conduct 
its own investigation and sought direct access to the questionnaires and 
corresponding memoranda of employee interviews. Were these 
investigation materials privileged? Answering in the affirmative, the 
Supreme Court explained that a broad privilege was necessary to 
encourage the corporation’s employees to come and talk to its attorneys. 
Free communication, in turn, would improve compliance. 
Upjohn’s holding rests upon two major assumptions: First, that the 
privilege improves internal disclosure, and second, that internal 
disclosure improves compliance. That the Court is thinking, in 1981, 
about corporate compliance is quite remarkable. But is the Court correct 
in its intuition that lawyers improve corporate compliance? Yes, we as 
lawyers think of ourselves as improving compliance, but we should 
consider whether this claim is as firm as we desire it to be, or whether 
the privilege generates other unintended consequences, such as the 
efficiency concerns, which may relate in part to what Geoff and Sean 
were talking about, although in a much narrower way. 
Now, one thing the Supreme Court does not do in Upjohn is 
provide us a bright line. The Court does not say, in effect, “Okay, 
corporations, from now on, if you want to make sure your 
                                                                                                                 
 16. See id. 
2016]                THE CHANGING FACE OF CORPORATE                 23 
                 COMPLIANCE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
communications fall within the privilege, here is what you have to do.” 
As a result, because of the Court’s holistic approach to privilege, one 
often comes across lower court opinions that inquire how closely a 
particular investigation resembles the investigation in Upjohn. Based on 
that determination, courts will then determinate whether the privilege 
applies. 
Now, let’s talk about corporate privilege debates throughout the 
1990s and 2000s. The big issue was waiver, which arose when the 
United States government, through the Department of Justice and United 
States Attorneys’ offices, began to place pressure on companies to 
comply with the law. Remember, in federal law, the corporation can be 
very easily prosecuted for a crime. Why? Because if you are a 
corporation and one of your employees commits a crime with an intent, 
not the intent, but an intent to aid the corporation, for example, keeping 
the company’s stock price high, you as the corporation can be held 
criminally liable, under respondeat superior principles, for what the 
employee did. That means for most corporations today, if you have 
10,000 employees or 50 employees, it is not all that hard to imagine that 
one of them is actually committing a crime with an intent to help 
themselves, but also to help the corporation. This means corporations 
can very easily come under fire if prosecutors want to, in fact, prosecute 
them for their employees’ crimes. 
One of the issues that arises in the 1990’s and 2000’s is, of course, 
the deferred prosecution agreement and the prosecutor’s exercise of 
discretion in offering an agreement in lieu of seeking formal charges and 
an indictment. In deciding between an indictment and a deferred 
prosecution agreement, prosecutors consider certain factors. One of 
those factors is how cooperative the corporation has been in regard to 
the government’s investigation of wrongdoing, and one of the ways the 
government measured cooperation in the 1990s and part of 2000s was 
by asking whether the corporation had waived its attorney-client 
privilege. 
Initially, the question that corporations were most worried about 
was whether a waiver of privilege executed with the government would 
apply equally to everyone else. If a shareholder plaintiff’s attorney 
wished to sue the corporation, would that attorney gain access to 
otherwise privileged materials from which the government determined 
there was no crime? This was the “selective waiver” question that was 
initially circulating when the government first began to demand waivers 
from cooperating corporate defendants in the 1990’s. Ultimately, a 
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majority of courts rejected the selective waiver doctrine, leading most 
corporations to conclude that a waiver of privilege would be broadly 
construed. 
During the 2000s, a different problem surfaced, which one might 
call the “involuntary waiver” problem. Prosecutors reportedly sought 
waivers too often and a “culture of waiver” became pervasive. 
Additional issues arose relating to how the corporation paid for 
attorney’s fees for its employees. Eventually, Congress threatened 
legislation, culminating in hearings held by Senator Arlen Spector. 
Faced with the prospect of an Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act,17 
the Department of Justice retreated and revised its charging policies. 
The Thompson Memo,18 which previously encouraged corporations to 
waive privilege, was replaced by the McNulty Memo,19 which offered a 
softer, lighter touch with regard to corporate privilege. It too was 
replaced by the Filip Memo,20 which eventually was incorporated into 
the United States Attorneys’ Manual. The Filip Memo explicitly directs 
prosecutors not to request core attorney-client communications, but 
maintains the importance of prosecutorial fact-gathering.21 
Thus, the claim that prosecutors commonly make is some variant of 
the following: “Look, we are not trying to find out what you said to your 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2009, S. 445, 111th Cong. 
(2009); Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4325, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
 18. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution 
of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ab 
a/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan20_privwaiv_dojthomp.authcheck
dam.pdf [http://perma.cc/VN7Y-G58H]. 
 19. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
to Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of 
Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/l 
egacy/2007/07/05/mcnulty_memo.pdf [http://perma.cc/6F9X-9TNQ]. 
 20. Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of 
Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/l 
egacy/2008/11/03/dag-memo-08282008.pdf [http://perma.cc/RR6P-U5G5]. 
 21. Id. 
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attorney. We do not really want to be in the boardroom and find out 
what happened when the board members were talking to the attorney 
and asking for advice. What we are really worried about is the 
nondisclosure of facts to the government.” That, at least, is the argument 
that one often hears. “We just want the facts.” 
That brings us to the present day. What are the contemporary 
corporate attorney-client privilege-related issues that concern us today? 
Two cases stand out. One is In re Kellogg Brown & Root, 22  which 
involved a defense contractor that used to be a part of Halliburton (I am 
referring to it as “KBR.”) The other case involves Wal-Mart.23 The case 
relates to a newspaper article some of you may recall from 2012, when 
the New York Times detailed how a Wal-Mart subsidiary, Walmex, 
allegedly engaged in bribery, and further claimed that the investigation 
of Walmex by Wal-Mart was inappropriately quashed. 24  These 
allegations led to a 2014 lawsuit in the Delaware courts concerning the 
proper application of the privilege when shareholders seek documents in 
order to evaluate the possibility of filing a shareholder derivative 
lawsuit.25 
As the KBR case demonstrates, courts and litigators still debate 
whether a given investigation is just an “investigation” or whether it is 
an attorney-client privileged investigation. As Geoff previously stated, 
corporate compliance has become big business and it has expanded 
beyond the general counsel’s office. That means we have a lot of people 
conducting investigations and not all of them are attorneys. Now, there 
is no rule that says it must be an attorney who asks the questions of a 
given employee for the privilege to apply. For example, if I am an 
attorney investigating what occurred, the exact questioner does not have 
to be me. I might supervise an investigator. 
Nevertheless, in determining whether the purpose of the 
investigation was to secure legal advice, courts tend to look at the fact 
that there were a lot of attorneys doing these kinds of investigations or, 
                                                                                                                 
 22. In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 757 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 23. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Indiana Elec. Workers Pension Tr. Fund IBEW, 95 
A.3d 1264 (Del. 2014). 
 24. David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After Top-
Level Struggle, N.Y. TIMES: BUSINESS DAY (Apr. 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2 
012/04/22/business/at-wal-mart-in-mexico-a-bribe-inquiry-
silenced.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/HF8R-RPAJ]. 
 25. See Wal-Mart Stores, 95 A.3d at 1267. 
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conversely, whether most or all of the questioners were not attorneys. It 
tends to matter who is doing the questioning, and whether the person 
doing the questioning is working under the close supervision of an 
attorney, or not really communicating with an attorney all that much. As 
Judge Posner tells us, “there is no private investigator’s privilege.”26 In 
other words, if the investigation is the brainchild of a private 
investigator, there is no privilege. 
In Kellogg Brown & Root, attorneys played a role in the 
investigation, but the lower court denied the privilege on the grounds 
that KBR’s investigation was not undertaken solely for the purpose of 
securing legal advance. KBR had investigated an employee’s allegations 
that it had overbilled the United States on a defense contract.27 The 
investigation, according to the lower court, was ineligible for the 
privilege because the company undertook the investigation for 
“regulatory reasons.” Since Department of Defense regulations required 
the company to conduct internal investigations, it would have sought the 
relevant information anyway from its employees. The lower court 
opinion makes a point of observing how different KBR’s investigation 
looks from the investigation conducted in Upjohn. 
The DC Circuit eventually overturned the lower court’s decision on 
mandamus.28 In doing so, the Circuit declared that seeking legal advice 
need not be the sole purpose of an investigation. Thus, the Circuit 
rejected the narrow “but-for” test that the lower court favored. 
Presumably, the Circuit felt that it had to do this if it was going to keep 
the corporate compliance function intact. No company today can 
genuinely say, “The only reason I executed this investigation was to 
secure legal advice.” Or, more formally, “But for seeking legal advice, 
the company never would have conducted this investigation.” Every 
company that investigates itself today does so, not only to secure legal 
advice, but also as part of its overall attempt to comply with legal or 
regulatory regimes. Meanwhile, the DC Circuit also discussed the 
                                                                                                                 
 26. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 481 F.3d 936, 938 (7th 
Cir. 2007). 
 27. United States ex rel. Barko v. Halliburton Co., 37 F. Supp.3d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 
2014). 
 28. See In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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resemblance between KBR’s investigation and Upjohn’s, and unlike the 
lower court, found KBR’s investigation “indistinguishable” from 
Upjohn’s. 
The DC Circuit’s discussion of the lower court’s ruling in KBR 
portrays the lower court judge as coming up with this but-for test all by 
himself, but, in fact, the lower court judge was relying on an earlier 
district court case, ISS Marine, 29  which also involved an internal 
investigation relating to a defense contract. 
Now, in ISS Marine, the defense contractor initially contacts 
Arnold & Porter and in response, the law firm sends an engagement 
letter detailing what it will do and how much its work will cost. 
Concerned that an investigation conducted entirely by Arnold and Porter 
will be very expensive, ISS Marine decides instead that it will conduct 
its own investigation (with some initial input by Arnold & Porter), and 
then remit the results to Arnold & Porter, who can then advise ISS 
Marine what to do. The issue then becomes: Is ISS Marine’s internal 
investigation privileged? The court in ISS Marine declares that it is not, 
in part because the privilege claim appears “premised on a gimmick [to] 
exclude counsel from conducting the internal investigation but retain 
them in a watered-down capacity to consult.”30 
ISS Marine was never overturned and presumably remains good 
law. Accordingly, if you are a company and you are looking at what 
goes on in these various courts, you have to be aware of the fact that 
efforts to make your investigation cheaper by, for example, using fewer 
attorneys, may well place the investigation within some non-privilege 
category. Then again, even when the corporation unabashedly uses 
attorneys to conduct its investigation, it still may find itself losing the 
privilege’s protection. 
Consider another case: Wal-Mart. In 2012, a New York Times 
article announced allegations of bribery by Walmex, Wal-Mart’s 
subsidiary. 31  The Times article includes an allegation that certain 
members of management intentionally short-circuited the company’s 
internal investigation of wrongdoing. Thus, the wrongdoing itself relates 
to how the internal investigation was conducted. Shareholders ultimately 
filed a request for books and records under Section 220 of the Delaware 
                                                                                                                 
 29. United States v. ISS Marine Servs., Inc., 905 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 30. Id. at 129. 
 31. Barstow, supra note 24. 
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code. 32  The purpose of seeking these materials was to see if the 
shareholders could make out a potential fiduciary duty claim against 
Wal-Mart’s management, a precursor to what might become a derivative 
lawsuit. Not surprisingly, Wal-Mart claimed the materials were 
protected by the privilege. In 2014, the Delaware Supreme Court 
affirmed the Chancery Court’s order, which forced Wal-Mart to produce 
much of what the shareholders are seeking, including privileged 
materials.33 
Here, the privilege was trumped by a different doctrine. Garner v. 
Wolfinbarger, a case decided back in 1970 by the Fifth Circuit.34 It holds 
that under certain circumstances, shareholders may obtain access to the 
company’s privileged documents. The Chancery Court further 
determined that under Section 220, the shareholders have shown 
essential need to execute a proper purpose, which is to determine 
whether Wal-Mart’s management engaged in the kind of behavior that 
would warrant a derivative lawsuit. 
So, the current state of affairs is that the privilege is alive and well 
but that atmospherics still matter. And, under the Garner doctrine, 
shareholders may obtain access to documents that everyone agrees is 
otherwise privileged. 
So with the legal summary out of the way, let me get to the 
normative question. What is the ideal privilege rule for corporate 
investigations? That question is best answered by asking what is the 
optimal corporate investigation? It strikes me that the ideal corporate 
investigation is one that spends the company’s resources optimally. The 
ideal corporate investigation is also one that conducts the investigation 
in a legal manner. This is particularly the case for an international 
investigation. And the ideal corporate investigation is one that identifies 
and discloses criminal conduct properly and that enables the corporation 
to learn from its previous mistakes. 
                                                                                                                 
 32. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220. 
 33. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Indiana Elec. Workers Pension Trust Fund IBEW, 
95 A.3d 1264, 1283 (Del. 2014). 
 34. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970). 
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Now I am assuming that if you have a broad-based corporate 
attorney-client privilege, two things happen. One is that the privilege 
causes the corporation to hire and include more attorneys in the 
investigation than it otherwise would. Two is that attorneys are, on 
average, more costly to the corporation than non-attorney investigators. 
Assuming those claims are accurate, how ought we to feel about the 
privilege? If we are interested solely in optimizing resources, a no-
privilege rule is better than a broad privilege rule because under a no-
privilege rule, you still might hire attorneys, but you will not hire 
attorneys just to secure the privilege. 
With regard to optimizing disclosure, I would argue that the effect 
of the privilege is more ambiguous than the Supreme Court and others 
suggest. In terms of executing the investigation in a legal manner, there 
is no question that it is better to have attorneys conducting the 
investigation, and in terms of optimizing learning, one can assume that 
attorneys improve the corporation’s behavior, particularly insofar as 
they are able to identify incipient legal issues and enable the firm to deal 
with those while they are still small. 
To return to disclosure: it is extremely difficult to conclude that the 
attorney-client privilege maximizes internal disclosure. If the attorney 
conducting the investigation delivers what is commonly referred to as an 
“Upjohn warning” wherein the attorney explains that the privilege 
belongs solely to the corporation and the corporation maintains the sole 
discretion to waive it, it is far from clear how such a rule maximizes 
disclosure because the warning effectively communicates to the 
employee that he has no legal protection whatsoever. Concededly, the 
privilege may increase disclosure from the corporation to a government 
agency or prosecutor, since an attorney in the boardroom will likely 
draw upon his legal experience and expertise in arguing why the 
corporation should disclose its wrongdoing to government authorities. 
But in that case, the corporation’s reason for disclosure has fairly little 
to do with the privilege, and is instead tied to its determination of 
benefits that arise out of disclosure, as well as the costs that will ensue if 
it fails to disclose and is caught anyway. 
So, this discussion suggests three possibilities for the future. First, 
we might conclude that there should be a privilege for all investigations, 
since that would remove the impetus to populate an investigation 
unnecessarily with attorneys. Presumably, that proposal would be dead 
on arrival, since courts and commentators believe sincerely that the 
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attorney brings something special and important to the corporate 
investigation. 
Aside from keeping the status quo (the second possibility), we 
could also move to the opposite end of the spectrum and decide there 
should be no privilege for any type of investigator, conducting an 
internal corporate investigation. This option also seems doubtful, but it 
raises an interesting question. Would the world really be so bad if we 
did not have privilege for at least that part of the investigation that 
focused on whether certain wrongdoing occurred? Keep in mind that 
were courts to apply broadly the aforementioned Garner principle to 
shareholder requests, this is the result we would likely reach. 
Shareholders would routinely seek access to corporate investigatory 
materials, and investigators (be they attorneys or non-attorney 
investigators) would act accordingly. Would such a result reduce 
internal disclosure or ultimately redound to the benefit of the corporate 
shareholder? Perhaps we will learn the answer to this question when and 
if shareholders more frequently seek materials pursuant to Section 220. 
Through such activity, we might learn whether the corporate attorney-
client privilege truly benefits the shareholder by maximizing internal 
disclosure and remediation, or in fact protects other constituents, such as 
the corporation’s managers. Thank you. 
STEVE THEL: Thank you, Miriam. I will take a few questions 
from the audience, but first I will give the other panelists a chance to 
comment on anything that anyone else on the panel said. 
GEOFFREY MILLER: My question is for Miriam. The lower court 
in the Upjohn case stated the idea, as we called it, that there should be a 
privilege only for the control group, but not for ordinary line employees. 
This idea sounds like the rather transient criticism you made of the 
attorney-client privilege and of the fact that the conducts of compliance 
are really applicable to the lower level employee, who does not 
understand what is going on, and in any event is not protected by 
privilege. Someone at the control group does understand what is going 
on and probably has their personal interests aligned with the company a 
lot more than, let us say, somebody who is on the ordinary line. We do 
endorse the lower court opinion and Upjohn giving the privilege to the 
control group. 
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MIRIAM BAER: One problem that immediately creates is the issue 
of defining who is in the control group. You will have litigation forever 
about who is in the control group, particularly since a lot of companies 
have changed and we do not necessarily have these hierarchical 
structures involving the shop floor, the middle man, and then the senior 
guy. That was the kind of company we imagined in 1980. Today, we 
have a lot of flatter companies. I am not sure even that administratively 
works so well. 
I do not know because, on one hand, I do find that this disclosure 
argument just does not work when you think about the lower level 
employee. In fact, I am bothered by the fact that the lower level 
employee might be talking to the lawyer because of a misperception, 
meaning he is given an “Upjohn warning” and he does not hear it. What 
he hears is, “Oh, is this a lawyer? Yeah, I can talk to him.” I think that is 
something that should bother us if he ends up speaking simply because 
of that misperception, although I must say that is exactly what happens, 
speaking as a prosecutor. That is exactly what happens with Miranda.35 
You have a police officer who gives a Miranda warning and someone 
sits there and talks his head off thinking somehow it is good for him and 
we get to benefit off of that. 
I guess my answer to that is no; I would not endorse it only because 
I am not sure that it works. However, I do agree that it seems to make 
more sense in some ways to think about the control group as more 
representative of the company. Normally, you think of the board 
member as being aligned with the corporation when there is no actual 
crime involved. I am not sure in the criminal context if the board 
member is actually aligned. I am not sure if anybody should have 
privilege is probably where I am going, which, as a lawyer, I find 
admittedly unsettling. 
GEOFFREY MILLER: Miriam, did you have a question? 
MIRIAM BAER: I had a question for Sean regarding the disclosure 
idea. Would it not be better if corporations disclosed a lot of stuff about 
their compliance programs? Two questions for you. First, is there not a 
risk that you are going to end up with the same problem that we have 
seen in executive compensation, which is that it ends up being a big data 
dump? It might even cause corporations to actually spend more, and 
spend more unnecessarily, so it ends up being a best practices work 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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behavior, but not good behavior. Second, could corporations make a 
legitimate argument that they do not want to reveal the stuff that really 
works because that is a trade secret? Should compliance be protected as 
a trade secret? Should we take the argument that compliance should be 
protected as a trade secret seriously? If I spent a lot of money figuring 
out what works, then I should get to keep the benefits for me. 
SEAN GRIFFITH: Two great questions. The first one I had not 
thought of; although, I do have this concept of compliance creep, which 
is that we all will look at our peer companies and see what they are 
doing. With regard to that concept, I suspect that it already occurs, so if 
there is public disclosure, it will not cause more compliance creep 
because I suspect that companies already look to the compliance 
processes of their peer companies. 
The trade secret question is an interesting one. If a company 
actually discovered the secret sauce on how compliance actually works, 
would the compliance details be in this public disclosure? My argument 
on public disclosure is a derivative of a prior argument I made about 
directors’ and officers’ liability insurance [D&O insurance]. Companies 
have to disclose, in that context, premiums, retentions, and limits. That 
would cause the capital markets to be able to see the gauge of 
wrongdoing that D&O insurance is inside the company and that would 
be good for capital market placing. 
In this context, what are the metrics that we would want to force 
disclosure in order to make compliance work better? I am not sure so I 
cannot answer the second question because I do not even know what I 
would ask them to disclose. The idea, I think, is that there ought to be 
some sort of compliance variables that we would know about and that 
assist the capital markets in gauging wrongdoing. What if they thought 
that it was worthwhile to have separated the chief legal officer from the 
chief compliance officer? 
STEVE THEL: Thank you. We have time for a few questions from 
the audience for the panel members. Any questions? We do have one. 
Thank you. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: It seems to me that you were pushing 
more for no privilege in the context of investigations. Would that not 
undercut what the attorney privilege idea or theory stands for? You 
would expect that in the context of attorney privilege, people would be 
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more forthcoming in terms of the investigation or at least seek advice 
because that privilege is there? I am wondering, how do you juxtapose 
that with no privilege for investigations in general? 
MIRIAM BAER: Two things. One, when we are talking about no 
privilege, I definitely would not suggest not having a privilege for, for 
example, transactions or any kind of true ex-ante advice seeking. In 
other words, if you are an attorney and I want to know in advance if we 
are about to do this deal, and they are asking me to send the money to 
this government officer’s wife, what do you think of that? I want a rule 
that encourages me to come to you and ask that question and feel good 
about asking that question. There is a very old paper by Louis Kaplow 
and Steve Shavell that talks about when it comes to ex-ante advice, 
privilege is good and socially desirable.36 We want to encourage it. 
The problem with ex-post advice, after I have already done it, now 
I come to you as an employee and I say, “Just so you know, I sent all 
that money to the government officer’s wife, and I hid it in the following 
way. I employed her as a consultant. What do you think about that?” 
You are not going to say to me, “By the way, we have this great 
privilege, and I am going to protect you, and all is well.” The most you 
are going to say to me is, “I should let you know, it is the corporation’s 
privilege.” If you are an ethically responsible attorney, you are going to 
say, “It is actually the corporation’s privilege, and it is really up to the 
corporation what we are going to do.” 
In fact, based on everything we know, it is quite likely that you are 
going to fire me, or you are going to give my name to the government, 
or any of those things. I do not understand then, when we are talking 
about ex-post behavior of what happened, how the privilege really gets 
people like me, if I am the sort of person who did the bad thing, to 
actually talk to you. Unless it is that I think that you are going to 
somehow protect me and keep your mouth shut. If that is the case, that is 
not socially desirable. That is where I am coming from. 
STEVE THEL: Anyone else? 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: To follow up on your question, I worked 
in my career at CA, which is a rather large corporation. One of the 
compliance function mottos was that you could report any wrongdoing, 
totally anonymously. In fact, employees were specifically encouraged to 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
961 (2001). 
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report wrongdoing. I have a lot of comments, but I will just stick to this 
one. Specifically, to go ahead and report anything because 
confidentiality and privacy was going to be maintained if they did so did 
seem to encourage employees to report wrongdoing. It was not that you, 
yourself, necessarily engaged in the wrongdoing, although you could be 
the one anonymously reporting, but there was a general feel that given 
that statement, a lot more people would come forward, which they did. 
As you said, in a 10,000 employee corporation, things did happen, not 
all of them drastic. If that were to be taken away, clearly a lot less of that 
would have occurred. So, can you comment? 
MIRIAM BAER: No, I understand that, although I wonder with 
your company whether someone made an actual statement along the 
lines of, “By the way, I engaged in insider trading and I thought you 
should know. Me and the gang are doing insider trading. Here is what 
we have been doing.” I find it hard to believe that general counsel’s 
office is saying, “That is fine. Thank you for letting us know. We will 
investigate this, and since you came forward, you will have 
confidentiality. We will never, ever remit your name to any authority.” I 
can not believe that your company’s policy did not have some little 
exception built in there that said, “Under certain circumstances, we are 
going to have to reveal what you did criminally.” That seems unlikely to 
me. 
STEVE THEL: All right. I will ask you now to join me in thanking 
our panelists. 
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PANEL II: EVOLUTION: IMPACTING FINANCIAL SERVICES 
GERALD MANWAH: Thank you all for coming back to the 
second part of our program. I am Gerald Manwah, and Sean had 
introduced me earlier on in the first session. I would like to introduce the 
panelists for this session. To my extreme right, I will start with Allen 
Meyer from Barclays, then Henry Klehm, followed by Martin Grant, 
Alan Cohen, and Stuart Breslow. 
I would like to start this off by asking the panelists to talk about a 
couple of things that came out of this morning’s session, but also to give 
their views in terms of the evolution of compliance with regard to a 
number of defining moments over the last ten to fifteen years. As many 
of you know, the regulatory landscape for compliance has changed 
considerably. There have been a lot of defining moments over the last 
ten to fifteen years. We all remember the events of September 11th. We 
also recall the events of 2008 and the financial crisis. We have seen 
censures in the financial services world that have gone beyond hundreds 
of millions of dollars to now in the billions of dollars, and what I will 
ask the panelists from my right, Stuart, going down, is to talk about how 
have you seen compliance change, particularly with regard to the 
reporting lines of compliance? 
In many institutions in the past, compliance was part of the legal 
function, but we are seeing a different, evolving model with regard to 
the independence of compliance sometimes being associated with the 
risk function, and more so, in some institutions, with part of the legal 
department. Stuart, we will start with you, and we will go on to see what 
models exist today, and what you think the future model will be. 
STUART BRESLOW: I am the chief compliance officer of 
Morgan Stanley. I guess I am the grand old man of compliance because 
my perspective goes back more than fifteen years because I am two 
months short of being the chief compliance officer for twenty years. 
Having worked in compliance for some time now, and having begun at a 
time when there were not many lawyers who were leading compliance 
efforts, I have certainly seen the evolution over the course of the two 
decades, and I do agree that over the course of the last six or seven years 
there has been the greatest change in compliance. 
I do report to the chief legal officer. I am a lawyer by training. I 
spent eight years at Morgan Stanley as a litigator before the fickle finger 
of fate pointed at me in April 1995, and I became the chief compliance 
officer. What I often muse about is how to do somewhat the same job 
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for twenty years. My job has not been the same job for twenty years. I 
became head of compliance for Morgan Stanley, the old investment 
bank, with about five thousand employees. In 1997, we merged with 
Dean Witter Discover, where I became head of compliance. In 2001, the 
civil war that erupted found its way to me, and I moved to Credit Suisse 
First Boston, and went to work as head of compliance for a Swiss-
headquartered organization, and, clearly, there is a very different 
corporate ethos in a Swiss organization. 
In 2005, Morgan Stanley was going down in flames because of a 
bunch of legal regulatory issues. The CEO was caused to leave and John 
Mack returned. The day he came back, he called me and asked me if I 
wanted to rejoin. In 2008, we became a financial holding company 
regulated by the Federal Reserve Bank. We also became a nationally 
chartered bank regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency 
[OCC]. I do remember, and I am not so sure that Tom will remember, 
but we came down on the Monday following our conversion to a 
financial holding company. We put the application in on Friday, we got 
it accepted on Sunday, which was not the usual course of affairs at the 
Federal Reserve Bank, and on Monday morning a whole bunch of us 
tromped down to the Federal Reserve Bank. We went down the row. I 
was probably about eighth or tenth in the group, and Tom had not asked 
me any questions at that point. He got to me, and Gary Lynch, the 
general counsel, was introducing each of the people that were in the 
room: the CFO, the chief risk officer, and down the line. Tom’s first 
comment in that meeting was, “So who do you report to?” At that point, 
I said, “I report to the chief legal officer. Are you okay with that?” He 
said, “I am okay with that.” 
We have since then re-validated that several times. Clearly, we are 
in a growing minority, as housed within the legal department. I report to 
the chief legal officer, who in turn reports to the chief executive officer. 
I am on the firm’s management committee. He is on the firm’s operating 
committee. We meet with the operating committee periodically. I meet 
with the board independently. It has worked for us. We have had a 
remarkably good run in the compliance space. I attribute it uniquely to 
my genius in the space. I am joking, but we have had a very good run. 
That is it in a nutshell. The other thing to note is in size. When I 
rejoined Morgan Stanley in 2005, there was probably a fifty-fifty split 
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between legal and compliance. There were 900 people in the group with 
450 in legal and 450 in compliance. Now, we are about 1300 people. 
Compliance is “to infinity and beyond,” in the words of Buzz Lightyear. 
We continue to grow every year. That is us. 
ALAN COHEN: I am older than Stuart is, but I have not been at it 
as long. First I was an academic. If we go with the chief ethics officer, I 
am probably the only guy on the panel with a PhD in political theory, so 
I may qualify. I left being an academic, law school, and the rest, and 
became a federal prosecutor for nine-plus years. Then I became a white 
collar regulatory defense lawyer for twelve-and-a-half years. Then I got 
the opportunity to join Goldman Sachs. 
That was in 2004, after the firm, with the help of Boston Consulting 
Group, completed a major study as to how to create an independent 
compliance function. The firm was probably much smaller. Today, it is 
roughly between 30,000 and 33,000 employees, but in 2004, a much 
smaller firm decided that they needed to figure how to have a truly 
empowered, independent compliance function. If I showed you all the 
questions that were asked at the time, you would find the same questions 
prevalent today, and in a lot of speeches by a lot of people on these 
panels, and in other forums. The questions were, where should we 
report? What should they look like? What are the right sizes, functions, 
and the rest? When I came, as a result of that study and conversations, I 
joined the management committee of the firm, which is the most senior 
committee of the firm. It was at the time, say, twenty-plus people. It has 
grown to thirty employees today. 
I sit there, as do the general counsel, chief risk officer, the chief 
financial officer, the heads of the operating divisions, and the rest. That 
is a different model, concededly, than what Stuart has just described. I 
report to the CEO. I have always reported to the CEO and have truly 
unfettered access to the audit committee. Nearly each audit committee, 
there is a presentation, but more importantly, before each audit 
committee occurs, I am at the prep sessions with the board. There is 
direct access and an ongoing dialogue with our board of directors as 
well. That decision was made in 2004. I think that the structure for each 
organization will be different, but for Goldman Sachs, that was the right 
structure. When I got there, there were, call it, 200 to 300 full-time 
employees in compliance, augmented by 50 to 100 consultants from a 
variety of firms. 
Fast forward to today, I will probably hit 950 people across the 
globe. What has happened in the intervening years? It is marked by 
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financial crises and other major disruptions in the city and in the world, 
as well as in the capital markets. Just focusing on compliance, it is the 
expectations of compliance that have so dramatically changed. I am sure 
we will talk about it on the panel. The things I do, and the panel with 
whom I work with today, are so radically different. Some of them are 
the same, but the breadth and scope of those activities and the depth are 
so radically different today that I can say that compliance has been 
transformed several times throughout the period that I have seen it up 
close and personal. 
MARTIN GRANT: I am Martin Grant. I have to first issue a 
disclaimer on my behalf and Tom Baxter’s behalf for his speech later 
that the views we express are our own, and not necessarily those of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. That 
said, I started at the Federal Reserve Bank in 1990 as a banking lawyer, 
became a litigator, and worked in enforcement for the first fifteen years 
of my tenure at the bank. 
In 2005, we began a compliance program with maybe three people. 
This was after a study with Deloitte regarding whether we could benefit 
from a compliance program and based on the guidance of our general 
counsel, our audit committee, and our board of directors. We were also 
thinking about Sarbanes-Oxley, and the failures of WorldCom and 
Enron in the years before, and whether we could also impose some sort 
of discipline on ourselves. 
We are an organization transformed by the financial crisis. We 
started at three, then became ten, and now have about forty-five 
employees. We have made huge investments in technology. Much of 
what we think about in terms of compliance is public integrity and 
trying to perform intake measures that are consistent with regulatory 
practice and that will ensure the public integrity of our organization. I 
will stop there. 
HENRY KLEHM: My name is Henry Klehm. I am a partner at 
Jones Day. I started my legal career after an abbreviated business career 
with the SEC. I spent ten years at the SEC in the enforcement section 
here in New York before joining Prudential, now Prudential Financial, 
in 1999. I spent three years there as the deputy general counsel, and then 
six years at Deutsche Bank as the global head of compliance, before I 
saw the light and got out of it. I went into private practice. 
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With respect to the fundamental question of what is the optimal 
organizational structure for compliance, when I got to Prudential, we 
had just resolved, or were in the process of resolving, the first big 
multistate settlement and some other issues involving limited 
partnerships. It was obvious at that time that the compliance department 
needed to be part of the legal department, primarily for reasons of 
protecting privilege. It made a lot of sense. 
Two-and-a-half years later, the then-general counsel absolutely 
hated having compliance reporting to him and that got changed. He was 
very much a lawyer and enjoyed the advisory part of being a lawyer and 
the proactive counseling, but did not so much enjoy counting how many 
policyholders had defects in their policy execution documents and 
things like that. That is a microcosm of what I think has driven a lot of 
organizational structure. That is to say, is compliance about being an 
advisory function on a trading desk or is it about making sure that 
everybody takes their anti-money laundering [AML] training every 
year? Are we counting noses or are we counseling proactively on 
transactions? I think when I was at Deutsche, talking about 
organizational creep and other things, we went from 400 to 780 
compliance people in six years, and that number is even higher today. A 
lot of that related to increased regulatory obligations. 
Since I have been in private practice since 2008, I probably 
counseled thirty or forty of the Fortune 500 companies about 
compliance programs. The answer, I think, is that it depends on what 
works for your organization, the expectations of your board, your audit 
committee, and the people that are involved. If the general counsel does 
not want to deal with counting noses of how many people took AML 
training, then he is probably not the right person to be doing that. 
I know I have had some discussions with general counsels of major 
financial institutions that are not here today, and right now, they are very 
happy to not have compliance reporting to them because it is an 
operations and systems implementation game. We are spending 
enormous amounts of time developing and implementing global 
surveillance systems, global training systems, and things like that, which 
are not the core competencies of most people, other than Stuart Breslow, 
who have law degrees. 
I think that is the way of the future, and when I talk to public and 
private companies not in the financial services sector about how to do 
this, that is really what it is about. What do you want that function to be? 
I know we are probably going to talk about what is effective 
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compliance. I think that is a question that people have to answer before 
they decide to whom your compliance officer is going to report. 
ALLEN MEYER: My name is Allen Meyer, as Gerald reflected at 
the beginning, and I work for Barclays. I have a group called Global 
Compliance Services and Strategy, which is a bit of a mouthful. We call 
ourselves GCS&S, and we are essentially the central utility for all of the 
common parts of compliance. I will not get into the details of it, but I 
will walk you through my background before that. 
I have all sorts of interactions with other panel members going back 
in my history. I was the global co-head of compliance at Credit Suisse, 
and during some of that period at Credit Suisse, I worked with Stuart. 
Before that, I worked at UBS, and before that, I worked as an 
enforcement attorney at the SEC, where I bumped into my neighbor on 
the left here quite a few times. 
I have been in a senior compliance role since 1996, so I have, like 
many of my panelists, been on the journey to where we are today and 
where we are going in the future. It is simply going from the fringe to 
the center. Compliance, whether you are talking about the reporting line, 
investments, staffing, or stature within the organization, has continually 
moved upwards for a period of time. Around the financial crisis, that 
climb accelerated. The expectations were higher from the regulators. 
The expectations of senior management and the attention paid by senior 
management all grew over that period and uplifted quite dramatically 
around the time of the financial crisis. 
The reporting lines of compliance at Barclays changed a couple of 
years ago to be directly to the CEO. The size of the department is 1200-
plus for compliance, excluding the AML population, which would bring 
us to an overall number of about 2000 employees. 
Addressing Henry’s point, I think it is both. It started, maybe, as an 
advisory function where people sat on the trading desk from compliance 
and advised on daily transaction flows. I think it is still a key component 
to be at the table, being engaged with business people, knowing what is 
going on, on a daily basis. But I also think the check and challenge piece 
has become more important. There has been huge investment in it and 
technology associated with it, and I think to get to where you are going, 
and again, it is a continued evolution, you need to be working on both of 
those and taking both of those to the next level. 
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STUART BRESLOW: Look, we are all in financial services. I 
think financial services is far more mature when it comes to compliance 
than virtually any other industry. Maybe pharmaceuticals and aerospace 
are comparable, but there has long been a structure for compliance in 
financial services, so you see the numbers. We all have a thousand or so 
people doing compliance. That is not ordinarily the case. I am sorry, 
except for Martin, who has got three. It is a very different game in 
financial services and it has led to a very robust set of programs. 
Obviously, there is still some work to do, but it is very technologically 
based with a lot of arms and legs doing the work. 
GERALD MANWAH: On that point, Stuart and I will just ask a 
few other people, in terms of if you were to look at industries outside of 
financial services and pharmaceuticals, what do you think is the future 
of compliance programs in large Fortune 500 companies? Especially, we 
have seen an uptick in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act37 violations and a 
number of things that everyone trying to build a compliance program is 
doing. Do we see that there can be some benefits from learning from the 
financial services group, in terms of building those compliance 
programs? Alan C.? 
ALAN COHEN: I’ll yield to Allen, the other Allen on the panel. In 
my career before coming to Goldman Sachs, and since, I have seen 
companies really across the economy. Pharmaceuticals and aerospace 
are, if you will, the other highly regulated industries, though not nearly 
as regulated except in the accounting and government contracting space. 
Anybody who contracts with the government needs super high 
compliance because getting that right is incredibly important. In 
pharmaceuticals, it is much too easy to be crushed by running afoul of 
those regulations. 
The truth of the matter is, and again, I have seen this before, and 
during my experience at Goldman, in companies we interact with, if you 
are doing business in global markets you better have a very strong 
compliance program because the world is a really complicated place. If 
you are shipping, if you are going in and out of a port, or if you are 
interacting in parts of the world where there are different expectations 
around who gets paid for what, even if it is just a ministerial act, the 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012)). 
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world in which we live has gotten very complicated as a money 
laundering matter, as a bribery matter, and as a sheer compliance matter. 
A case that I dealt with before I even came to Goldman Sachs, 
towards the end of my private practice career, was a person who had 
been indicted in China for providing meals to doctors who would come 
into their tent basically on their break. The world and its laws is a very 
complicated place. Even though this is a very United States-centric 
panel, the laws around the world and around these very issues are 
equally complex and sometimes inconsistent, but all need to be attended 
to. 
The UK Bribery Act38 may just be the easiest way to punctuate that 
sentence. This Act is a UK law that effectively takes the United States 
Government’s approach to governmental bribery and applies it broadly 
to governmental and commercial bribery. 
STUART BRESLOW: As a standard-setter in corporate non-
prosecution agreements in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act space, we 
have seen our group raided by Fortune 500 companies who are suddenly 
looking for the secret sauce. That has been interesting to see, but we 
have all attended meetings of compliance professionals of other 
industries, and we go there, and we tell them that we have 850 
employees in compliance or we have 950 employees. They say, “I have 
four,” or “I have six.” Other industries have to learn. They have to really 
understand it and embrace it, and not just because of bribery. There is a 
whole set of corporate ethics you would be concerned about that others 
do not seem to enforce and reinforce the way that we do. 
To put it a little bit more generically, I think it is about the level of 
legal risk that the enterprise is willing to withstand. As Alan said, if you 
are dealing globally and internationally, you have to pay attention to 
how you reconcile those regimes. It is no longer just about the financial 
services industry. If you are an automobile company and you are 
shipping parts internationally, there are a lot of opportunities for 
mischief. Increasingly, the conversation involves whether you 
understand the legal risks that are facing your company. The hardest part 
of that for a person who has the two, three, or four people in his 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 (UK). 
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compliance department is looking ahead and saying we are doing this 
business now, and we are shipping auto parts to Brazil and stuff like 
that. Five years from now, what are the legal risks that are going to be 
associated with that? 
I think it is also reputational risk and regulatory risk. I think we 
have seen so many cases of industrial corporations where there have 
been very lax manufacturing processes because the cultures in those 
organizations do not really understand the expectations of management. 
That really does get communicated through the compliance groups. 
ALAN COHEN: Pretty much every manufacturing company has an 
embedded compliance function. It may not be a separate compliance 
function that stands alone, but an embedded compliance function. You 
just run through the list of activities you could get wrong. Think vitamin 
manufacturers. They thought they were fine because they thought they 
had the manufacturing process covered. They forgot that when people 
went on the golf course, they could actually violate the anti-trust laws 
pretty wantonly. The entirety of large United States companies and 
global companies, Siemens, Daimler, and the rest, all have learned the 
lesson that having strong compliance programs, and strong compliance 
and value cultures, is of critical importance today. 
MARTIN GRANT: The one thing I would say, though, is agreeing 
with what everybody has said, I think that when you sit down with 
people outside our industry, we always go in thinking we are really 
special. It is really different, but the basic principles of what are the 
rules and regulations, what are the polices that are articulated, how do 
we train people on them, and what is the check and challenge to make 
sure people are doing it, and it might be slightly different, but the 
manifestation of who is doing the check and challenge, are really very 
universal issues and universal challenges. 
STUART BRESLOW: Yeah, but the concept of lists is not 
relevant. I sort of disagree with that concept. I do think that every 
organization has to have some document called a code of conduct that it 
publicizes broadly to all of its employees. They know what the 
organization expects of them and what they can be measured against. 
There are a bunch of other things, whether it is an integrity hotline, 
training program, policies and procedures, or things that, if you do not 
have them, you look awfully unwise when there is a problem, not just 
because the prosecutors are looking for it and you are looking for the 
credit under the federal sentencing guidelines, but also because that 
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reinforces a corporate ethos. It is really critical to the success of a 
corporation. 
GERALD MANWAH: Maybe I will just ask Martin. Because you 
are in compliance within the Federal Reserve of New York, how do you 
think that is consistent with other units within the Federal Reserve and 
your counterparts, the OCC and the SEC, in terms of building internal 
compliance programs like what you have built at the Fed? 
MARTIN GRANT: The Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
combines a supervisory agency with an operating arm of a financial 
institution. So while our colleagues in Washington write the rules and 
guidance for the industry, we have to implement the best practices and 
guidance internally. We have a lot of lessons that we learn by doing 
what our colleagues broadly in the federal government have not 
experienced. Starting with a code of conduct, we are all subject to the 
same government ethics rules, but we have invested much more 
significantly in an ethics program that is comprehensive and employs a 
lot of people in order to make sure that our staff is knowledgeable, and 
to ensure that they have all the tools to do well in the operation in their 
day-to-day jobs. 
GERALD MANWAH: I will pose these two questions to each 
panelist that came out of this morning’s session. Should compliance 
programs be treated as trade secrets or should there be public disclosure 
on compliance programs? Just continuing the conversation from a 
practitioner’s perspective, and I will start with you, Stuart, provide your 
views with respect to more transparency in terms of those programs, and 
maybe consistency and uniformity vis-à-vis your peers in other 
industries that are highly regulated. 
STUART BRESLOW: A least from the start, going back two 
decades, we have always taken the view that compliance is not a trade 
secret and that, in fact, the entire financial services industry suffers 
when any of our peers suffer. We try to share best practices. Over the 
years, Alan, Allen, and I have spent many hours together trying to figure 
out the secret sauce, to the extent that there is one. I still remember when 
I first took over the job back in 1995 that I spoke to peers in other firms, 
and, without violating anti-trust laws, we took the view that, in fact, best 
practices were important and we should all engage in them. 
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We have lots of forums for doing that. We have always done that, 
and I would never treat compliance as a trade secret. In fact, from my 
perspective, the more we have industry standards, the better served we 
are, so that we know that everyone is actually behaving to a similar 
standard. The biggest problem we run into is when our employees say, 
“They are doing this at XYZ Bank, why can we not do it here?” The 
answer is that they really are not doing it at XYZ Bank, and if we all 
knew that we had similar standards, we would be in better shape. I do 
not see that one as a runner. 
On the other question of disclosure, I thought the interesting point 
there was that there would be more data to do more research on the 
value of the programs. I thought that was interesting, although once you 
get into the world of SEC disclosure and the quality of disclosure, I 
think Sean is right; it becomes an issue of what is it that is being 
disclosed. What is the format for doing it? What is the ability to generate 
comparability around it? I would be in favor of it, but I just hope it does 
not become another one of these exercises in routine disclosure. 
GERALD MANWAH: Alan? 
ALAN COHEN: I actually think that I have probably spent more 
hours with these guys, and I am going to include Martin in some of this, 
talking about best practices and how to do various aspects of the job that 
we all do over the years. That has all been enormously helpful. 
I will say that I think one of the places where the regulators broadly 
could do a better job is, and I have made this point in one-on-one 
conversations and I am not embarrassed or afraid to make it here, 
drawing from the lessons that they learned by going across different 
institutions and saying, “Here are some best practices, and here are some 
things that we learned.” Every one of these institutions represented here 
is entirely different. We all have different cultures. We are very much en 
vogue when talking about institutions, but each one of the institutions 
has a different culture. 
We at Goldman, because of size, can have a partnership culture and 
share those values through forums with all of our MDs, led by our 
chairman. We can do that with all of our MDs and vice presidents. That 
has been going on since I got there in 2004, although at the present, they 
just keep rolling on different themes. We can do that because we are 
32,000 people. You cannot do that if you are a couple hundred thousand 
people. You can articulate values and train people in those values 
broadly, but how you go about it will have to be different. I use that just 
as an example of what are the best practices around modified and 
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adapted for different institutions. What are the best practices around 
surveillance? Or insider trading? Every institution has insider trading 
risk. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Need a lawyer? 
ALAN COHEN: The most useful thing I remember the SEC 
publishing recently was when Steve Cutler went around and did the 
conflicts review in…? 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: October 2003. 
ALAN COHEN: Even though he promised to do so, he left 
beforehand, but subsequent to that, on different rounds, we have had 
some best practice documents. I actually think that disclosure from our 
respective institutions will never be good enough to actually be much 
helpful to the investing community, in my humble opinion, given its 
nature. We need a lot more disclosure by our regulators around best 
practices, the ability to go in and see what happens in different 
institutions. One of the best documents, and I recommend it to you, is 
the senior supervisory group review that came after the financial crisis. 
Global regulators went into institutions across the world that were 
impacted by the crisis and, concealing their names, they talked about the 
different things that worked well and did not work well at different 
institutions leading up to and during the financial crisis. Incredibly 
important, penetrating documents around risk management, compliance, 
control, governance, and the rest. 
MARTIN GRANT: I had somewhat of a counterpoint on 
developing communities of practice in that ethics and compliance 
professionals have organized themselves in associations and those 
associations have grown tremendously. There is tremendous sharing. I 
think they could be more supported by large organizations. The second 
thing is that consulting firms have partnered with some publications to 
develop surveys so that there is some amount of information sharing. It 
may be at too high a level for the kind of world that Sean is talking 
about in terms of measures of effectiveness that can be used by 
shareholders. 
HENRY KLEHM: I guess the reason I am in private practice is 
because I am the skeptic on all of this. First, on the issue of trade secrets 
and benchmarking, and sharing all of that information, it is great if you 
are right in the middle of that pack. If you are at the bottom of the pack, 
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your regulator is saying, “Klehm, why haven’t you got more resources?” 
If you are at the top of the pack, your management is saying, “Klehm, 
you are way too expensive.” 
It gets very difficult to have a principled conversation. The reason 
we are different is we have people in forty-two different countries, and 
the people that you are comparing me to have people in twenty or ten 
countries. The benchmarking, trade secret issue, I think, becomes very 
difficult. I do think, to Martin’s excellent point, there are lots of 
societies, such as SIFMA, the Institute for International Banking, and 
the American Bankers’ Association, that I think are ideal formats for 
sharing that kind of stuff. 
With respect to the best practices and promulgations by regulators, 
I agree with Alan that the Senior Supervisory Group report was 
fantastic. The problem that I see a lot of times though, when you know 
the underlying facts of some of this, is that fact gets a little lost in 
aspiration. The regulators have an agenda that they are trying to drive. It 
is very difficult. Even if they do not, sometimes boards or senior 
management have a skeptical view of that and so they are going to take 
that with a grain of salt. 
With respect to the disclosure idea, the public disclosure idea, I 
guess my first question is, disclose what? We have seen in the wake of 
Dodd-Frank, the enhanced risk disclosure required in registration 
statements and 10-Ks, and proxy statements about Compensation 
Disclosure and Analysis, and the like. What I see happening a lot on the 
private practice side is people managing to the disclosure, which is not 
thinking necessarily what is the best for our organization, but how do I 
disclose it in a way that makes me look just look like everybody else. 
To me, the proof of that was, believe it or not, when that rule first 
went into effect, CVS’s parent, Caremark, was the only company that 
year to disclose that it thought that its compensation systems drove 
inappropriate risk-taking by management. Of course, the next year it 
was gone. That had changed, and nobody that I am aware of has a 
disclosure saying, “Our compensation system drives too much risk.” It 
just does not happen. People will morph to the disclosure standard in a 
way that, I think, over time becomes somewhat counterproductive. 
GERALD MANWAH: Thank you. Allen? 
ALLEN MEYER: Being the last guy in the line sometimes has its 
disadvantages, having not much left to say that has not been said. But 
other than just as a practitioner, the more sharing best practices and 
lessons learned from the industry, whether from the regulators or among 
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ourselves, has a huge value. As a senior compliance leader, you are 
coming in every day asking how to do it better. You have the changing 
regulatory landscape, the latest thing in the newspaper that happened to 
a peer firm. It is the absolute challenge for us in senior leadership 
positions and compliance to keep evolving. You do not have a lot of 
time or money to make mistakes and chase down blind alleys. 
Generally, the direction of travel should be sharing and transparency, 
but I guess there are a lot of issues in terms of how to effectuate that. 
GERALD MANWAH: Over the last few years, there has been a lot 
of evolving thoughts and changes in terms of what is known as the lines 
of defense. Who owns the first line of defense for a large corporation, an 
entity or highly regulated financial services company, especially when 
they are global in nature? With respect to the first line of defense, the 
second line of defense, the third line of defense, and the independence of 
the compliance function, there is a lot of discussion about the culture of 
firms. 
What I would like to get from each of the panelists is your thoughts 
on organizations, particularly large organizations, having a culture. 
What does that mean today, especially with the evolving regulatory 
environment and regulatory expectations? Maybe I will do it in the 
reverse order, Allen M., so that you can speak first? 
ALLEN MEYER: I guess I walked into that. I think there has been, 
for financial institutions, a lot of focus over the last few years on the 
overall risk management framework, which has a lot of implications. 
Going back to my comment before, there is a lot to do. There is a lot to 
do for operational risk. There is a lot to do for the compliance 
department—the first line of defense. Everything is changing. I think it 
is a great value to define your overall risk management framework. Who 
is doing what? What is the borderline between the compliance function 
and the operational risk function and the market risk function and the 
credit risk functions? That is sort of worth doing. What are the 
borderlines? Who is responsible for what? That is across the horizontal 
axis. The vertical is really the first line, which is business, people that 
run businesses, and their responsibilities. Second line is the risk 
functions. The third line is usually internal audit. I think it is also 
worthwhile to sort of clarify the vertical axis. Addressing what is the 
first line of defense’s responsibility and ensuring they are responsible 
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for managing that risk across that waterfront. You have problems when 
they do not feel like they own it. They are waiting for compliance to tell 
them what to do. While you can never tease it out to “What do I do this 
day?,” if you are sitting in one of those chairs, a business chair, or a 
second line of defense compliance type chair, it is worth setting out, 
clearly, roles and responsibilities and making sure people understand it. 
It is when it is not clear when things start going wrong. 
HENRY KLEHM: I think in terms of organizational culture, every 
large organization on the planet is ultimately driven by how people at 
the top of the organization are compensated. What are the key metrics or 
the key performance indicators about how they are compensated? If 
there is a perception that my friend, Allen here, is in a second-tier 
function, and therefore is compensated in a different way, or on a 
different grid, then the frontline function is taking business risk, or 
theoretically taking real business risk, not legal risk. There is going to be 
a natural stature issue there. 
I think it is a very challenging thing for a board to look across an 
organization and think about how to put everybody on the same grid. 
The fact is you are all supposed to be doing different things, whether 
you are the first or the second or the third line of defense. When you get 
into that nomenclature that I know everybody is into right now, I think it 
really starts to say, “I am a tier-one guy. Therefore, I count more, and 
my compensation should reflect that.” What does the tier-two guy have 
to say about your compensation? What does the tier-three guy have to 
say about your compensation? How are those measures put back into 
that? That will have the biggest impact overall on organizational culture. 
The other thing I will say is everybody talks about the Johnson & 
Johnson credo that has been around forever, and has only had very 
minor modifications.39 It is worth reading that story, and it is worth 
understanding the whole Tylenol thing, and how that fit together 
because that is a true issue.40 The leader of the organization, at a critical 
point in time, was willing to take zero risk. He did not take profit risk on 
                                                                                                                 
 39. See JOHNSON & JOHNSON, OUR CREDO, http://www.jnj.com/sites/default/files/p 
df/jnj_ourcredo_english_us_8.5x11_cmyk.pdf [http://perma.cc/4VKC-ZTR7]; Our 
Credo Values, JOHNSON & JOHNSON, http://www.jnj.com/about-jnj/jnj-credo 
[http://perma.cc/AX5G-72M8]. 
 40. See Jennifer Latson, How Poisoned Tylenol Became a Crisis-Management 
Teaching Model, TIME (Sept. 29, 2014), http://time.com/3423136/tylenol-deaths-1982/ 
[http://perma.cc/3D4L-TQS7]. 
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this at all. He put the potential consumers of Tylenol absolutely first 
regardless of how that panned out for the organization. That is an 
extraordinary leader. It takes an awful lot of guts to do that. When you 
have a leader that is willing to do that, or Jack Welch, who used to have 
the 9-blocker at GE, which was a miserable day or two for everyone in 
the operating businesses, when he, the head of internal audit, the head of 
legal, the head of compliance, and the head of HR sat down people and 
went through all the metrics of their business organizations on all of 
these kinds of things. You have got to have that type of engagement 
from the top to do that. When you get into a huge organization like Wal-
Mart, with 2,000,000 employees, it is even more difficult to do. 
MARTIN GRANT: We have been thinking about culture a very 
long time. We have been aided by people like the late Rush Kidder, and 
he always says that the culture is the stories that organizations tell about 
themselves. In the story of Johnson & Johnson and the story of Wal-
Mart, the leaders’ actions matter as do their words. Incentive structures 
matter as do the risk appetites of firms, so they can be organized in a 
way, and it has to do with the leaders of the organization stressing and 
emphasizing that compliance is everybody’s responsibility. Good 
behavior is everybody’s responsibility. 
There are lines of defenses. The business people are often at the 
first line, and they have responsibilities to escalate issues and seek 
advice from both lawyers and compliance professionals as the matters 
arise. There is a role for everybody. While there is a lot of line tending, 
like this is our risk management responsibility or a control 
responsibility, I think the more organizations stress that good conduct is 
everybody’s responsibility, and escalation is a key part of it, I think 
organizations are going to be better off. I will leave it there. 
ALAN COHEN: I actually agree with what these guys said. I do 
think often the conversations are on lines of defense. This is Martin’s 
point, which is that everyone in the organization must agree on what 
those values are. We set out fourteen. John Whitehead, who passed 
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away yesterday, had fourteen business principles that basically laid out 
the values of the firm that our firm has tried to live by.41 
After 2008, we went through great soul searching around those 
values, and did a lengthy report with a series of seventy-nine 
recommendations to reinvigorate and give very concrete action steps 
around them, but that was a report of the firm. The ownership and 
execution of those action items as well as those principles belongs to the 
firm, driven from the top. I talked earlier about having the chairman of 
the firm sit down in groups of MDs and VPs. Unless the shared values 
are, one, articulated, and, two, become owned by the senior 
management, there is a risk that this lining up of defenses says, “I do not 
have to worry about that. That is her job.” 
I think unless people—and we have actually changed the charters 
of every one of our committees—unless everybody understands that 
everyone’s job is reputational risk and protecting the firm, there is a risk. 
I think it is a risk that people will say compliance is the ethics officer’s 
job because that is who is supposed to stand up and say, “That is 
unethical.” You have to make sure that the values and the principles that 
the firm has agreed to live by are well understood and embedded, along 
with the consultation process and the review process, and the rest. Then 
the question is, what does compliance have to do with that? Guess what? 
Compliance at Goldman Sachs gets asked whether Sally should be 
promoted. Is there a reason Sally should not be promoted? Has Mary 
engaged in conduct that should be taken into account in connection with 
her compensation this year? What are the review scores? Unless you 
embed it throughout, there is this risk with lines of defense that it 
minimizes different people’s roles when they should be shared roles. 
STUART BRESLOW: Going back to Sean’s comments earlier that 
if compliance were as omnipotent as he would have it be, and we have 
subsumed and subverted all corporate governance, I quibble with Allen 
on the three lines of defense. What compliance does is it facilitates and 
oversees compliance by the organization. Going to Martin’s point, 
compliance is everybody’s job. It is not just the compliance 
department’s job. 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See Goldman Sachs, Goldman Sachs Business Principles, GOLDMAN SACHS, 
http://www.goldmansachs.com/who-we-are/business-standards/business-principles/inde 
x.html [http://perma.cc/D72C-WS55]. 
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The mistake would be that we are compliance or ethics housed in a 
group of you guys. You are the ethical conscience of the organization— 
you and you alone. What the first, second, and third lines of defense 
have really done is made clear to the business lines that they are first and 
foremost. It is their business. They are transacting. They are on the line. 
They have to make sure that it gets done right every day. “If they have 
questions about it, come see us. By the way, we will be watching them 
to make sure they do it, and internal audit will be watching us to make 
sure that we do it.” 
I do agree too that these are not philanthropic organizations. People 
go to work for financial services to get paid money. I guess that is a real 
surprise for most of you in the room, but people actually get paid to 
work at these places. We look at people who have done bad things. We 
try to figure out whether or not they should have their compensation in 
some way, shape, or form docked. We also are very much involved in 
the annual evaluation process. We look at employees who have low 
scores on their annual evaluations in their ethics and compliances 
competencies that are rated. We too have the same sort of partnership 
culture, a little bit further removed from Goldman Sachs, as we went 
public in 1986, but at the core of Morgan Stanley is an old partnership. 
I still remember when I was at Credit Suisse and the Morgan 
Stanley regime was going down in flames in 2004. My colleagues were 
saying, “You seem to care. Why do you care?” The answer was because 
I had been there for so long, and those of us who were there and were 
members of the partnership really cared passionately about it, not the 
same way you care about it if you are at a Swiss organization, or 
perhaps even a German organization, or even some of the larger UK 
banks. In our world, we were partners and it mattered passionately to us. 
In the end, when that regime went down in flames, we saw it coming 
and we knew it was going to happen. 
MARTIN GRANT: I think the main point though is that values and 
culture are essential. You can have the best compliance department in 
the world, the greatest risk management structure in the world, but if the 
values and culture are not there, then it is going to be very difficult. 
STUART BRESLOW: Our elevator speech is not, no offense, 
fourteen points. It is a first class business in a first class way, as the 
people who are the true successors to the J.P. Morgan legacy say very 
2016]                THE CHANGING FACE OF CORPORATE                 53 
                 COMPLIANCE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
simply and very straightforwardly, and we have four very simple points 
that have been our expositions of that. It is very clear to all employees 
what is expected of them. 
GERALD MANWAH: I will ask the panel now a number of things 
because I am mindful of the time, and we would like to open up the 
floor for a few minutes so that people can ask questions. I will ask a 
number of things in one question. 
In terms of the challenges for compliance for the future, we have 
seen the demands for compliance officers far exceeding the supply of 
people who are trained in the space. We also see the importance of 
technology, but not whether or not the investment in technology gives 
you the bang for your buck, and whether it is consistent across the board 
in terms of its effectiveness. We have also seen a trend to looking at 
behaviors and practices. What causes people to behave badly? When 
you look at some of the regulatory censures, it is not an organization 
filled with 300,000 employees that are all culpable. It is a small group of 
people that are actually doing some bad things. Of course, that 
corporation is liable and pays these hefty fines, as we have seen the 
criminal actions in some of the recent cases with Credit Suisse and BNP 
Paribas. The future of compliance is based on this landscape, and I will 
just ask the panelists to talk about where they see compliance as 
evolving based on some of these challenges. Stuart, I will start with you. 
STUART BRESLOW: Challenges. I think the Federal Reserve has 
it right. One of the big questions is, how do we ever demonstrate 
program effectiveness? That remains for me the holy grail. We have all 
kinds of performance metrics. We have the things we do. We do make 
sure that every employee at the firm, from James Gorman on down, 
acknowledges their code of conduct every year. We do make sure that 
every employee from James Gorman on down does his anti-money 
laundering training and other training that we get around to the firm. We 
do have our metrics around surveillance and testing, but in the end, do 
we know if we have an effective program? We have not figured that out 
yet. We do know we have a program in size. We just cannot definitively 
demonstrate that it is effective. We do know that for purposes of the 
federal sentencing guidelines we have a program that ticks all the boxes. 
We have had independent law firms come in and validate that for us. We 
do know how our size compares to others because we have had 
consultants come in and do that for us. We have had horizontal reviews 
by our regulator. We know where we stack up that way. In terms of 
whether we have made that impact on the organization that is 
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demonstrating effective culture, we do not know, but we do know that 
we have a strong culture at its base. 
Second thing is that there are a lot of jobs for compliance 
professionals right now. The number, and I am looking at the HSBC 
results a couple of weeks ago, is ten percent of their 258,000 employees 
are in risk and compliance associated with anti-money laundering. 
Where do you find those people? What do you do with them? How do 
you make sure they are doing their jobs properly? If it is tough here in 
the States, it gets tougher in Europe, and even tougher in Asia. We run a 
global business and it is very hard to find qualified staff, but we are 
doing the best we can. We have all been hiring a lot of young people, 
both young graduates of colleges and young graduates of law school, 
and train them up. Finding the bodies to do that is very difficult. 
ALAN COHEN: I agree with what Stuart said. We all have the core 
elements and beyond in each one of them, whether it is certifications, 
training, a lot of focus on culture, and the rest, or in the job of 
preventing and detecting the firm, engaging in combat that would 
violate rules, cause reputational damage, or in other ways result in a bad 
impact. I think only results tell us that. The reason I say that only results 
tell us that is because if nothing ever happened in the world, you would 
say your compliance programs were perfect. It may or may not be true, 
but oftentimes, when bad things do happen, there is a strong compliance 
program over here that missed what happened over there. It did not 
ignore it. More often than not, it was not that someone knew it was 
going on. In those instances, it was just egregious, and that falls into my 
bad people will do bad things category. People miss things. 
If you read the conversations that come out around LIBOR, as an 
example, those conversations which occurred in chat rooms lead me to 
not ask whether there are effective programs. We have effective 
programs, but they are not perfect. They cannot be. They will miss 
things. What I actually worry about going forward is how to get better at 
finding where the problems are that I otherwise will have missed. 
That goes to your technology question. Every month, every year, 
there are a billion e-communications that occur at Goldman Sachs. How 
do I find that chat, or series of chats, associated with prices? In some 
cases, it is voice. In some cases, it is electronic communications. I need 
to associate that data with a market price, maybe with a voice 
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conversation and maybe with better knowledge as who the 
conversations are between and among and the rest. How do I get a better 
view of that? In order to do what? In order to find instances where I 
should be preventing bad behavior, or knowing that it is not bad 
behavior. How to do a better job of that? That goes to the crush of 
compliance talent. 
Tentatively, I am not so sure, to go back. I am not sure what the 
return on investment is on hiring thousands and thousands of new 
graduates to look at account opening documents. We might be better off 
hiring thousands and thousands of technologists who could actually 
figure out how to find the money launderer, or the person who is 
engaging in misconduct. We have not gone that way, in large part, 
because nearly most of these settlements have resulted in people staffing 
up in easy—and it is hard to staff up—or in easier ways than solving the 
problems that I am worried about, which is how to find potential 
misconduct and stop it. I think that is one of the greatest challenges. 
STUART BRESLOW: Just by way of comparison, we have 
3,000,000 e-communications a day at our organization that occur 
globally. I think we are all in the same boat in this in terms of trying to 
use big data providers, the guys who figured out the Boston bombers, 
and tried to pull together lots of information from lots of different data 
sources within the organizations. 
ALAN COHEN: Just to take away, a billion emails? Every month 
we record, if you played it end to end, ten years’ worth of voice. 
STUART BRESLOW: Although it is digitized now. 
ALAN COHEN: It is digitized, but the United States Government 
cannot even record that well. 
MARTIN GRANT: I was going to talk about smaller challenges: 
onboarding new staff and the importance of training and education on 
the culture. How do you make sure that the people who join your 
organization share your values and understand the key message? That is 
a core challenge. A lot of institutions find it a good thing for many 
junior staff, at least in trading desks, to have dialogue about misconduct, 
to the extent that you can get them early on the company culture and 
values. 
HENRY KLEHM: I am going to go from that to very high-level 
observation. I think globalization of business transactions poses a 
number of risks that make the life of compliance very difficult. I think 
one of the biggest challenges, and you can look at the emails in the BNP 
case or you can go back to see when Alan C. was doing anti-trust 
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defense, is developing in a global organization mutual respect for all 
countries’ laws and regulations, and how they are enforcing them. That, 
I think, is a very big challenge. I think if the BNP executive that had 
written the incredibly unfortunate email had really appreciated the 
seriousness with which the United States Government takes that 
conduct, I think he would have had a far different outcome. How 
compliance can convey that in a multicultural organization, and I know 
that some of us have worked for organizations with Germanic or Swiss 
roots, is a huge challenge, particularly if the systems are really rooted in 
different notions of what a corporation exists for. 
I know here, despite what Professor Griffith said earlier, that 
corporations still do exist for the benefit of the shareholder. I think the 
European view, or the Germanic view, that the corporation exists to 
better society, lead to vastly different value systems around how you do 
that. Getting multinational businessmen to understand that you have to 
respect United States law the same way the French expect me to respect 
data protection law when I am doing business in France is an enormous 
challenge for compliance. 
ALLEN MEYER: I am going to even take it at a higher level than 
Henry. I think the challenge is like the big bang theory. The universe 
just keeps expanding, and us, as compliance professionals, keep trying 
to contain something that continues to grow indefinitely. I think the 
challenge is to, and I think Alan sort of alluded to it, work smarter, 
whether you have to come up with different ways of looking at hiring 
and onboarding compliance talent and training them or better uses of 
technology where we are looking for detection of a bad actor rather than 
just compartmentalizing a person sitting all day, looking for one type of 
word or something like that that comes in our lexicon. How do we use 
our resources, which we have continued to grow with the greatest 
leverage at the points of the most impact in the organization, to impact 
in the culture? Trying to take away from the daily flow of challenges 
that come at you and sort of continue to return back to being strategic, 
how do you work smarter and have more impact? 
GERALD MANWAH: Thank you all. At this point, we would like 
to open up the floor for questions. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: There is a lot of talk about culture and it is 
salutatory. It strikes me though that it is also ex-ante. If you have an 
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adult employee whom you have to teach integrity to, is it too late? 
Maybe there should be more of a focus on hiring practices? I am not 
saying you have to hire all Eagle Scouts who believe in God and love 
the United States uniformly, although maybe that would be good, but is 
there an ability to emphasize employment practices and who you are 
hiring if you have to teach them culture? For example, if there is a law 
against it or not, I am not going to trade with the enemy of the United 
States, but it seems that some of your organizations have problems 
where people not only do not recognize that there is a law, but they need 
a law to tell them not to do it. 
MARTIN GRANT: I was thinking about hiring practices. Issues 
around grade inflation in college and that everybody is great, and when 
they come to work that they all want to be great, and then, especially 
with trading floors, your performance is measured every day. Will 
people look for an edge? How do you prevent that? Did they in their 
past life? It is hard to tell. “You cannot do that here,” is something that 
you want to emphasize and stress. I do not know if there is a great 
failing in moral education in America, but we do see incidents, repeated 
incidents, of misconduct by fairly junior people. 
ALAN COHEN: I am going to separate your two points just to 
start. I actually think there is enormous focus on hiring people who are, 
in fact, ethical, moral, great in their job, and the rest. I think it is a bit of 
a straw man that you set up on that one. The amount of time that is spent 
on that is enormous. That being said, nobody can get that perfectly. That 
would be point one. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Straw man? Nobody mentioned it except 
to the gentlemen to your right. 
ALAN COHEN: The reason I think it is a straw man is I think you 
should know that the amount of time that is spent in hiring people who 
are the right people for the job, both by talent and temperament, is 
basically enormous. I think it is like thirty interviews before somebody 
ends up getting a job at most of these places. There is no litmus test that 
anyone has found for someone who, notwithstanding shared values in a 
place, will not lie, cheat, and steal. Guess what? In any town of 100,000 
people, somebody will do that even if everybody around them is telling 
them not to. West Point is an example. A lot of Eagle Scouts, but they 
have a lot of cheating. I was an Eagle Scout, by the way, just for the 
record. It happens in places where you would have certified to the 
culture, and we, because we are on the detective side, are still spending 
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enormous amounts of time trying to find the people who, 
notwithstanding that we thought would do the right thing, do not always. 
ALLEN MEYER: People do not always tell the truth. That is the 
bottom line. I think when people are under stress over a protracted 
period of time to, let us say, make the trading profit or something like 
that, I think it is virtually impossible in a hiring scenario to determine 
when somebody is going to be willing to cut a corner. 
STUART BRESLOW: Beyond that, making sure you have clear 
guidance to all employees what you expect of them is no different than 
saying to a first-grader, “Here is what we expect of you.” There is no 
doubt about what is expected of every employee of the organization 
straightforwardly, and setting up cultural norms and behavioral norms 
for the organization, and if people get out of line, then they punished for 
it. The harder part is that you incentivize the good behavior, and 
demonstrate the incentivization of the good behavior, which is another 
thing we struggle with within this organization. 
ALAN COHEN: I think there is a regulatory problem here as well. 
This is not so much in the United States, but outside the United States 
where people leave one firm and go to another firm, you will never 
know whether the person who you hire has left the other firm. Certain 
regulators around the world, I am being slightly careful here, actually 
receded, in my view, from their obligation to collect that information 
and disseminate it. There have been a lot of incidents. I will bet we can 
compare notes on this panel where people have left each of our firms for 
cause, in substance, and have been hired by the next firm with 
knowledge of the supervisory authorities that that was going on. I think 
that is probably something that people ought to be addressing as well. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Following up on that, it strikes me that 
there are two types of groups that, if you were in compliance, you would 
be most worried about. One is what you might call the meticulous 
planner. This is like the bad guy who plans out his wrongdoing from day 
one, and because he knows he is engaging in wrongdoing, he covers his 
tracks. That is really the hard guy to find. 
Then the other type of person, which I imagine is more prevalent, is 
the falls-into-it guys. He falls prey to temptation. There is something 
right there, and he is under pressure, and he takes that thing, that magic 
thing that is hanging there when he should not. It strikes me that there 
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are different ways that you might want to respond differently to the 
meticulous planner than you would to the fall-prey-to-temptation. Is that 
something that you have thought about in your respective practices? 
Where you say to yourself, “We are not necessarily going to worry so 
much about the Bernie Madoff, who may be in our firm, but we are 
worried about the guy who falls off the wagon.” 
ALLEN MEYER: I think it is a great way to ask the question. I 
think, through the panel, we have been thinking about both of those 
people. The second one, the inadvertent drifter into misconduct, that is 
really about culture and making clear what the firm expects of you. 
Having compliance, having a powerful role, and them understanding 
that drift to get an edge is not acceptable. That is a cultural point. I think 
the second point when we talk about surveillance and detection, we are 
evolving that, trying to listen to voice and electronic communications 
and marrying it together with trade data. That is sort of the detection 
one, where we are stepping up on both levels at all of our firms, taking 
them both seriously. 
ALAN COHEN: We need to figure out what in the world it looks 
like. It is really hard to get into people’s heads to figure out whether 
they are thinking they are the meticulous planner or the opportunistic 
actor. Since I know I cannot largely get into their head, I can tell them, 
make sure they understand what the value proposition is and what the 
expectations are, but after that, accepting the two categories, I am trying 
to figure out what it will look like. What the aberrational conduct would 
look like just as fast as I can. I cannot prevent it. I have stipulated that 
based on these two cases, but I want to be able to know what that little—
in the sea of data—what that little blip is going to look like when either 
one of those motivations leads somebody to do something that is beyond 
the norm. 
How do I know that? How fast can I know it? I am not going to be 
able to get into their head. I have had people. There is some great 
technology out there, where people have come to us and have said, “I 
can tell you, just by listening to their voice or analyzing their emails, 
who is the disgruntled employee.” Everybody that has had a disgruntled 
employee in the room should be laughing right now, because it never 
happens. I said, “Here is a test. I am going to give you a bunch of 
voice.” I have done this. I said, “Here are two terabytes of voice. Tell 
me who is disgruntled. I happen to know one who is in the pot.” Nobody 
has told me. I keep hoping that somebody will do that because then I 
have lots of digits for them to look at. 
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HENRY KLEHM: I think it is almost a dichotomy because the end 
result is the same. If you think back to a case that Alan and I have spent 
a lot of time on. Joe Jett had problems with other firms and tumbled to 
Kidder Peabody, and realized that this was his last shot at Wall Street. 
He saw an aberration in the computer system, which he then exploited to 
the extreme. It is not like he went in there knowing that that aberration 
existed. He spotted it and then engaged in a course of conduct over 
eighteen months that was devastating ultimately to the firm. I think all 
you could see at the end was the classic rogue trader. 
GERALD MANWAH: Anything anyone else wanted to add? Did 
we have any more questions? 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: We heard from Professor Miller earlier 
this morning about trying to figure out, with all his equations, what the 
most efficient spend on compliance is. My question to you is, how does 
regulatory pressure affect that spend? I think what he was trying to say 
earlier was that firms will try to spend the optimal amount of money, but 
how true is that or how exactly can that happen when there is extreme 
pressure from regulators to actually beef up or do other things for 
departments? 
HENRY KLEHM: I think, if I remember correctly, he was talking 
about probability and the size of the fine. I think the pressure from the 
regulators increases the probability. I think the impossible, in his 
equation and in my mind, was predicting the fine. I think if you looked 
at AML enforcement in 2008, I do not think anybody would have 
predicted an $8 billion fine. I think there were other externalities, for 
example the advent of the Department of Financial Services, that wound 
up driving that fine to an incredible level. Looking back at the conduct, 
we now see what it is. I thought it was an interesting idea. I think it is 
virtually impossible to do. 
GERALD MANWAH: Anyone wanting to add anything? If not, I 
would like to thank all of the panelists for their contribution this 
morning. We will now move on to the next session. Sean is going to 
introduce the next speaker. 
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS42 
SEAN GRIFFITH: It is my great honor and pleasure to introduce 
Tom Baxter from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Tom Baxter 
is the general counsel and executive vice president of the legal group at 
the New York fed. He has also served as deputy general counsel of the 
Federal Open Market committee. Mr. Baxter supervises the day to day 
operations of the New York Fed’s legal group which includes the 
Federal Reserve’s law enforcement unit, the corporate secretary’s office, 
the compliance and ethics function, the banking applications function. 
He also serves in the bank’s management committee. Mr. Baxter, as you 
may know, has published many books, many articles, relating to legal 
aspects of banking, as well as a number of important articles in what 
works well and what we should be doing different in compliance. So, it 
is my great pleasure to turn the podium over to Tom Baxter. 
THOMAS BAXTER: Let me begin by thanking Professor Sean 
Griffith, the director of the Corporate Law Center, and Robert Lyons, 
editor of the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, for 
inviting me to participate in this symposium about corporate compliance 
and corporate governance. Let me also thank Fordham Law School for 
hosting the symposium. I would also like to recognize a colleague who 
is with us today. He is Martin Grant, who is the New York Fed’s chief 
ethics and compliance officer. I have had the privilege of working with 
Martin for the last twenty-five years, and much of what I have learned 
about compliance I have learned from him. 
In the space sometimes labeled compliance, we have come a very 
long way in a relatively short time. In about twenty years, compliance 
has transformed from a nice idea to an important component of most 
major corporations. This is especially true in the highly regulated 
industries, including the industry where I have made my career, 
financial services. We could spend much time discussing how this 
transformation happened. From my vantage point, it happened because 
of the combined effects of the Federal sentencing guidelines, the 
Delaware Chancery Court’s Caremark decision,43 and the post-Enron 
                                                                                                                 
 42. The views expressed by the speaker are his own and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. 
 43. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Lit., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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legislation known as Sarbanes Oxley.44  Of course, other events also 
fueled the transformation, and in the financial services industry, the 
worst financial crisis our country has seen since the Great Depression 
became a burning platform. 
While it is always important to look back at the road traveled, I am 
not going to spend any more time on that particular topic. Instead, today 
I intend to look forward at where compliance is going, and to forecast 
for our future some things we should pay attention to now. I will discuss 
five different items, and I predict that some of the greatest 
accomplishments for compliance are not in the recent past but in the not-
too-distant future. If we plan ahead, and if we can successfully adapt to 
changing circumstances in our respective industries and in the national 
and global economies, then twenty years from now you will listen to 
another keynote speaker remarking on further amazing progress for the 
compliance profession. In short, we are on our way to another level. 
Most of my remarks today will be devoted to the things that I 
believe will get us to the next level. Let me turn to them now. 
The nomenclature that is used in compliance to describe the 
company officer responsible for compliance has changed, and the 
change in nomenclature is a clue to revealing a material, substantive 
change. Twenty years ago, we called this officer the “compliance 
officer”, and I emphasize the singular. Over several years the title 
morphed, as compliance programs developed and compliance jobs 
multiplied, both with respect to subject matter expertise and the types of 
skill sets needed to make compliance programs “take”. Consequently, 
companies found that the compliance officer turned into the chief 
compliance officer, because in major companies, it took a village to get 
compliance done. Compliance, you see, turned from singular to plural. 
More recently the title has again changed. In many companies 
today, the title is chief ethics and compliance officer, or CECO, 
reflecting a salutary trend on the part of many companies to integrate 
ethics and compliance. Why is this happening? In my view, it is 
happening in recognition of the fact that it is easier to have an effective 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2012)). 
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compliance program in a company that nurtures a strong ethical culture. 
In a recent speech, Daniel Tarullo, a governor of the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, accurately observed that “culture” is a 
“somewhat contested academic concept.”45 Yet, the evidence is growing 
that an ethical culture produces tangible benefits, including making 
compliance more effective. 
Recent studies attempting to assess the effectiveness of compliance 
programs have developed a measure called the “PEI”, or Program 
Effectiveness Index. Early work with the PEI shows that companies 
combining their ethics and compliance programs tend to have better PEI 
scores. The reason for the higher effectiveness measure seems to be 
something that I find perfectly rational. Ethics programs, consisting of 
measures taken to inculcate organizational values, help to create a 
culture that is not only conducive to following rules that are embedded 
in law and regulation, but also conducive to compliance with company 
mores. A strong ethical culture breeds a more compliant culture. 
The symbiotic relationship between ethics and compliance arises 
because of the close connection between values and rules. Ethics is 
about values and compliance is about rules. You obtain the beneficial 
symbiotic effect when the values and the rules live in harmony. A 
different result is obtained when you have organizational values that 
conflict with the rules. 
One of the very exciting areas in compliance today relates to how a 
company’s strong ethical culture can impact corporate behavior. One 
aspect of this behavioral change relates to the greater tendency of 
corporate constituents to follow the applicable rules when the culture is 
right. Looking to the future, I envision we will see much more empirical 
research that shows the benefits of merging ethics with compliance, and 
placing both in the hands of a trusted corporate officer with a catchy 
new name—the chief ethics and compliance officer. As we move to the 
next level, ethics and compliance will increasingly become a part of a 
single program. 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Conference, “Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry,” New 
York, New York, Good Compliance, Not Mere Compliance (Oct. 20, 2014), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20141020a.htm 
[http://perma.cc/YX7F-CAGQ]. 
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The last twenty years have demonstrated the benefit of ethics and 
compliance in identifying legal risk and taking operational measures to 
keep that identified legal risk within the organization’s accepted risk 
appetite. In most applications, though, compliance has been the vehicle 
that prompts the organization to reduce risk by constraining activity. In 
the financial services industry, correspondent banking provides an 
illustrative case. 
Correspondent banking is the business of effecting funds transfers 
for other financial institutions. Because the U.S. dollar is the 
international medium of exchange, financial institutions throughout the 
world have a need to effect dollar-denominated transfers of funds. 
Ethics and compliance professionals in U.S. banks have pointed out that 
this type of business presents several different legal risks: money 
laundering, terrorist financing, and sanctions evasion are the most 
obvious and the most notorious. There is no doubt that these compliance 
professionals are correct. One consequence of their being right, 
however, is that U.S. correspondent banks decided to “de-risk”. To 
execute on the de-risking mandate, many U.S. correspondents stopped 
providing correspondent banking services to those perceived to present 
such risk. 
As a result, certain elements of the global financial services 
industry now find it increasingly difficult to transact business in dollars. 
There is a concern by the U.S. correspondents transferring funds for 
Middle Eastern customers that the correspondents might unwittingly be 
providing services to a terrorist organization, or be enabling a person or 
affected sovereign to evade economic sanctions. So, the correspondents 
close accounts for many banks in the Middle East. Similarly, there is a 
concern by the U.S. correspondents transferring funds for Latin 
American customers that they might unwittingly be providing financial 
services to drug traffickers, a money laundering risk. So, they close 
accounts for many banks located in Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia. 
The de-risking exercise succeeds in its risk-reducing objective, but it 
succeeds in an overly broad manner by cutting services indiscriminately 
to so many. 
The adverse and unintended consequences for certain regions of the 
world are clear and present. There are also implications for U.S. policy 
with respect to the role of the dollar as the international medium of 
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exchange. These issues, while highly consequential, are not the object of 
my remarks today; rather, they are a symptom of what compliance can 
lead to—namely, a reason to restrict business activity. Given the size of 
penalties for violations, and the potential reputational damage associated 
with this business, it is easy to understand the business judgment to 
avoid risk. 
The success of compliance over the last twenty years has 
conditioned business leaders to think about compliance as a pathway to 
terminate or constrain a risky business relationship. However, it is 
possible to look at compliance in a very different way, as a two-way 
street and not a “one-way” street. Let me explain what I mean. A sound 
and effective compliance program can be used, appropriately in my 
view, as a tool that would permit on-boarding of what is seen as risky 
business. 
To continue with the example of correspondent banking, if a U.S. 
correspondent had a sound and effective compliance program that was 
well tailored to identify and control the risks of money laundering, 
terrorist financing, and sanctions evasion, this correspondent might 
become sufficiently confident to on-board risk. This means that instead 
of closing many accounts in a specific geographic area, it would 
continue with some of these accounts, or even open new accounts. Now, 
I do not want anyone to think I am saying that all correspondents can 
reasonably have such confidence now. At this point in our journey, I 
concede the need to develop greater confidence that the identified risks 
can be controlled at a reasonable cost. With that said, I believe that we 
will reach a place where ethics and compliance programs are sufficiently 
developed so organizations can make considered decisions to on-board 
risk and keep it within the accepted risk appetite by using effective 
controls. I look forward to that time as we move to the next level. 
I mentioned earlier one of the promising new tools to assess the 
effectiveness of ethics and compliance programs, and that is the PEI, the 
Program Effectiveness Index. The excellent report by the Ethics 
Resource Center, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines For Organizations 
at Twenty Years, has drawn attention to standards for assessing program 
effectiveness.46 The report states: “Altogether, the lack of assessment 
                                                                                                                 
 46. ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR 
ORGANIZATIONS AT TWENTY YEARS: A CALL TO ACTION FOR MORE EFFECTIVE 
PROMOTION AND RECOGNITION OF EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS PROGRAMS 
 
66 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
standards and guidance on how the quality of a compliance/ethics 
program should influence the outcome of a matter create the impression, 
validated by the [Ethics Resource Center] and Conference Board studies 
. . . that too many judgments are being made inside a black box.”47 
While we seem to be on the cusp of a number of promising 
indicators, like the PEI, the truth is that we are not there yet. We simply 
do not have a tool that will give us an accurate and reliable measure of 
program effectiveness. Instead, we have a situation where enforcers 
(including those agencies with civil enforcement authority, such as the 
banking agencies) tend to be result oriented. When we see that a 
particular organization has experienced a major compliance failure, we 
tend to view the failure as evidence of the ineffectiveness of the ethics 
and compliance program. We reason backward, “if the program were 
effective, this would not have happened.” I think this is natural and 
understandable for the enforcement community, but it is not necessarily 
good policy. To borrow an observation from Senator Ted Kennedy 
concerning the Federal sentencing guidelines, this creates “a risk that 
companies without substantial compliance programs will get a free ride, 
and those with strong programs will not receive the credit that they 
deserve.”48 
Alternatively, if there were a reliable and acceptable measure of 
program effectiveness, this kind of backward reasoning would be 
replaced by reliance on the effective measure. Institutions could use the 
measure when making arguments for leniency, again assuming that the 
measure demonstrated that their programs were effective. It might, of 
course, show just the opposite. And there are other, perhaps even more 
important, benefits. If an industry and its regulators came to have great 
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 48. Edward M. Kennedy, Senator, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Proceedings of the 
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confidence in a particular effectiveness measure, this might provide a 
foundation for building a program that could be used to on-board risk. 
Put differently, a particular organization could have confidence that its 
ethics and compliance program would be protective because the 
program had been validated by a well-accepted measure of 
effectiveness. 
Some of the skeptics will say “you are dreaming”. When I hear 
them, I am reminded of the words of George Bernard Shaw, and 
specifically the reminder to dream things that never were and ask “why 
not”.49 
Over the past twenty years, as ethics and compliance has moved 
through infancy and into early childhood, we have become committed to 
the process and procedure that is emblematic of a program. There is 
much about this progression that is good. The building of compliance 
programs has produced real benefits,50 and these benefits have created 
the compliance profession. There is a risk too. The risk is that the 
process and procedure that is the substance of the compliance program 
will become a kind of iron cage, restraining innovation so that the 
organization cannot adapt to changing circumstances. In short, the 
process and procedure can stifle speed and agility. 
One place where this has occurred recently is in financial services. 
Some institutions witnessed some malefactors violating the law and 
engaging in anti-competitive practices with respect to the setting of the 
Libor rate. Those institutions responded to very specific rate fixing 
abuses, but they did not envision that the abuses with respect to Libor 
could also be occurring in other businesses, like foreign exchange. 
Compliance, in this particular instance, was not adaptive. Compliance 
professionals, in this instance, did not show the needed speed and 
agility. They did not reason along the lines that “if it is happening 
concerning Libor then it might be happening concerning foreign 
exchange.” 
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As compliance becomes increasingly routinized and subject to what 
the consultants would call the “repeatable process”, the process can have 
a tendency to drive out creative thought. As creativity dissipates, so does 
the ability to connect related occurrences. In the next 20 years, we will 
need simultaneously to perform repeatable processes and to think 
innovatively. We will need to continue to build the routines and 
repeatable processes. Yet, we will also need to be sufficiently flexible to 
see around corners, to where new problems are emerging, and new risks 
to our franchises are developing. This is what it will take to be 
successful at the next level. 
I commend Fordham for focusing this symposium on compliance 
and governance. They are related and intertwined. The four items 
discussed all relate to compliance. My last item touches on governance. 
As I speak with chief ethics and compliance officers, a regular topic 
of conversation is conflict with the business leaders who own the risk. 
This is a little unsettling, because during the last twenty years we have 
been successful in establishing as a better practice the approval of the 
compliance program by the board of directors. One might think that, if 
the board of directors approves the compliance program, then it should 
not be difficult for the chief ethics and compliance officer to get the 
business owners to pay close attention. 
The devil here, as in so many other places, lies in the details. It is 
usually the implementation of the compliance program that causes the 
conflict. It is usually related to the cost of compliance, because the cost 
ordinarily affects how the business owner measures success, which is 
the size of the business’ profit. The chief ethics and compliance officer 
will not be able to resolve the conflict easily, because compliance is a 
cost to the business which can make compliance the adversary of the 
business owner. The chief ethics and compliance officer will not want to 
bring a specific conflict issue to the attention of the board of directors. 
While this might be very effective in resolving the specific conflict, it 
could absolutely destroy her ability to function effectively thereafter. In 
a recent survey of chief ethics and compliance officers conducted by 
Price Waterhouse, the survey respondents identified as a problem their 
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“struggle to gain the attention of the board of directors.”51 Two specific 
issues were identified. One related to fear on the part of the chief ethics 
and compliance officer to engage in action to resolve a conflict with a 
key business person—a fear of losing one’s job or her place in the 
corporate hierarchy. The other problem concerned access to the board of 
directors. It is one thing to go before the board of directors annually to 
have the compliance program approved. It is quite another to go before 
the board of directors to do battle with a senior executive who is 
probably before the board of directors on a regular basis. 
One possible solution as we move to the next level is to embed 
ethics and compliance issues in the disciplines that are more typical of 
governance issues involving the board of directors. These would be 
issues like strategy, business goals, and risk management, all of which 
touch ethics and compliance. Another solution would be to create 
escalation pathways to the board of directors for resolving conflicts 
between the chief ethics and compliance officer and a senior business 
leader. 
As I said at the outset, ethics and compliance have come a long way 
in a very short time. We have learned a great deal during the journey. As 
I look out over the road ahead, I believe we will continue to make 
significant progress in business organizations that deliver on their value 
proposition, not only to shareholders, but to the other constituents that 
these organizations serve, their customers, employees, and communities. 
Ethics and compliance will be an important part of that progress, 
provided that ethics and compliance is nurtured by a strong ethical 
culture, in a company following sound corporate governance, and 
employing the best and the brightest personnel. I am excited about the 
road ahead. 
Thank you for listening. 
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